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But look! here come more crowds, pacing straight for the water, and
seemingly bound for a dive Strangel Nothing will content them but the
extremest limit of the land; loitering under the shady lee ofyonder ware-
houses will not suffice No. They must get just as nigh the water as they
possibly can without falling in. And there they stand-miles of them-
leagues. Inlanders all, they come from lanes and alleys, streets and ave-
nues-north, east, south, and west. Yet here they all unite. 1
H. Melville
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing public use of coastal beach property and increasing private de-
velopment along the oceanfront 2 are intensifying the inevitable conflicts between
private beach owners and the public. These beach battles3 are forcing into litiga-
tion the question of public rights in coastal beach land.4 The nature of these
rights varies from state to state, but the trend in most jurisdictions is toward
recognition of a legal right of the public to access and use the beaches.
A property owner5 can hinder public use of beaches by obstructing the
beach area or otherwise restricting its use, or by denying access to it. The issue
of "beach access" involves both aspects-the right of the public to use the dry-
1. H. MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 3 (Rinehart Press, 1957).
2. Comparisons of travelers' expenditures between 1970 and 1982 in five North Carolina
coastal counties illustrate the growth of tourism. In Brunswick County (Ocean Isle, Southport, and
Long Beach) expenditures increased 701.4%. In Carteret County (Atlantic Beach, Beaufort, and
Emerald Isle) the increase was 1,025.5%. In Currituck County (Knotts Landing, Corolla, Water-
lily) the increase was 168.4%. In Dare County (Kitty Hawk, Nags Head, and Kill Devil Hills) the
increase was 2,778%, and in New Hanover County (Carolina Beach, Wilmington, and Wrightsville
Beach) the increase was 611.4%. These percentages were calculated from figures reported in
NORTH CAROLINA STATE DATA CENTER, RESEARCH AND PLANNING SERVICES, OFFICE OF
STATE BUnET AND MANAGEMENT, NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr
480-81 (5th ed. 1984).
The number of permanent residents in these counties also has increased significantly. BeTw.
1970 and 1980 the population of Brunswick County increased 47.7%. In Carteret County the in-
crease was 30%. In Currituck County the increase was 59%. In Dare County the increase was
91.2%, and in New Hanover County the increase was 24.7%. Id. at 24. Projected population
figures for 1983 predicted significantly higher increases between 1970 and 1983. In Brunswick
County the predicted increase was 69.9%. In Carteret County it was 44.1%; in Currituck County,
80.4%; in Dare County, 119.1%; and in New Hanover County, 31.1%. NORTH CAROLINA STATE
DATA CENTER RESEARCH AND PLANNING SERVICES, OFFICE OF STATE BUDGET AND MANAGE-
MENT, PROFILE NORTH CAROLINA COUNTIES UPDATE 140-62 (Sept. 1984).
Private development has kept pace. In the Currituck Outer Banks over eight thousand lots
"have been plotted and many have been developed." T. SCHOENBAUM, ISLANDS, CAPES, AND
SOUNDS: THE NORTH CAROLINA COAST 273 (1982). The Dare County beaches are developing
"right up to the entrance of the Cape Hatteras National Seashore," and the beaches south to Cape
Fear "are already blanketed with motels, shopping centers, and beach cottages, and more of the
same is planned." Id.
3. In Maine, beach property owners have built fences, thrown rocks, and towed cars in an
effort to keep the public off their land. Martha's Vineyard property owners have begun hiring guards
to keep private property private. Serrill, The Gritty Battle for Beach Access, TIME, Aug. 27, 1984, at
48.
4. See cases cited infra note 21.
5. The terms "property owner," "landowner," or "littoral owner" will be used to refer to a
person owning oceanfront property. "Riparian owner" will refer to a person owning river or stream
property.
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sand6 and foreshore7 areas of the beach and the right of the public to gain access
to those areas across private uplands.8
A determination of title to the beach and uplands does not solve the prob-
lem of beach access because the right asserted by the public is use, not owner-
ship, of the land.9 Accordingly, the property interest granted to the public in a
beach access case is an easement10 delimited by the kind of use that gave rise to
the easement." Any use is permissible so long as it is within the general classifi-
cation of public uses related to the sea.12 Thus, one asserting a right of public
use of the beach may bring a shovel to build a sand castle but not a drilling rig to
build an oil well. 13
Legislation and judicial decisions evince a public policy that the unique na-
ture of beach land requires that it be treated differently from inland property.' 4
Under this policy, public use of the beaches is understood to derive from the
6. The dry-sand beach is the stretch of beach between the mean high-tide line and the line of
vegetation or dune line. D. BROWER, W. DREYFoos, L. EPSTEIN, J. PANNABEcIER, N. STROUD &
D. OWENS, ACCESS TO THE NATION'S BEACHES: LEGAL AND PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 20 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as AccEss TO THE NATION'S BEACHES].
7. The foreshore or wet-sand beach is the area between the mean low-tide line and the mean
high-tide line. Id. at 19-20. This area also is referred to as the tidelands. See BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 1329 (5th ed. 1979). For the practical importance of the tidelands in determining the
scope of public rights, see Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967) (state cannot extend its
ownership to land beyond tidelands); Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935)
(tidelands belong to state).
8. The upland is landward of the vegetation line. ACCESS TO THE NATION'S BEACHES, supra
note 6, at 20; see also Maloney & Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High Water
Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C.L. REv. 185 (1974) (discussion of measurement of tidal
lines).
Other public rights in the North Carolina coastal area are discussed in Schoenbaum, Public
Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1972). See also Access To THE NA-
TION's BEACHES, supra note 6 (discussion of public access from a planning perspective); R.
DUCKER, DEDICATING AND RESERVING LAND TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO NORTH CAROLINA
BEACHES (1982) (discussion of public access from a planning perspective).
9. See Eckhardt, A Rational National Policy on Public Use of the Beaches, 24 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 967, 971 (1973).
10. The easement is both negative and affirmative; it prevents the property owner from ob-
structing the public's use of the property (e.g., by building fences or seawalls) and allows the public
limited use rights. The landowner retains the fee simple interest and can make use of the land in
ways consistent with the easement. 3 IL PowELL, REAL PROPERTY 424, at 34-258 to -260 (1984);
see also City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974) (defendant's
construction of sea tower consistent with public recreational use).
11. See J. CRIBBETr, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 344 (2d ed. 1975) ("[T]he nature
of the use which established the easement sets its scope as well.").
12. Such uses as sunbathing, camping, swimming, fishing, walking, and other recreational uses
have been found sufficient to create an easement. See Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
13. Eckhardt, supra note 9, at 971.
14. See City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 77 (Fla. 1974) ("The
beaches of Florida are of such a character as to use.., as to require separate consideration from
other lands .... "); see also State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969)
(unique nature of beach land requires application of ancient doctrine of custom).
Many judges have written lyrically of the uniqueness of beach land. Writing for the Florida
Supreme Court in White v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 190 So. 446 (1939), Justice Brown commented:
There is probably no custom more universal, more natural or more ancient, on the sea-
coasts, not only of the United States, but of the world, than that of bathing in the salt
waters of the ocean and the enjoyment of the wholesome recreation incident thereto. The
lure of the ocean is universal; to battle with its refreshing breakers a delight. Many are
1985]
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land as an inevitable right.15 The rationale for recreational beach easements,
then, may be the unique nature of beach land, rather than any favoring of the
rights of the public.16 Judicial hostility to private beachowners' obstruction of
public access is best understood in the context of this public policy. One English
judge argued on principles of public policy that
the interruption of free access to the sea is a public nuisance ....
The principle of exclusive appropriation must not be carried beyond
things capable of improvement by the industry of man. If it be ex-
tended so far as to touch the right of walking over these barren sands,
it will take from the people what is essential to their welfare, whilst it
will give to individuals only the hateful privilege of vexing their
neighbors. 17
There is no established right of public access to North Carolina beaches.18
This Comment suggests an "open beach" policy19 for North Carolina that will
ensure a public right to use and gain access to its beaches. 20 Judicial remedies
are analyzed and their possible use in North Carolina evaluated. Legislation
from other jurisdictions is examined to illustrate statutory solutions and result-
ing problems. Present North Carolina beach access acquisition legislation is dis-
cussed, as well as the need for and likely impact of further legislation. Finally,
the Comment recommends expansion of the public trust doctrine by the North
Carolina courts as the best judicial method to provide public beach access in
North Carolina.
II. PRESCRIPTION, IMPLIED DEDICATION, AND CusToM: WHEN PUBLIC
USE BECOMES A PUBLIC RIGHT
The common-law theories of prescription, implied dedication, and custom
have been used to claim public rights in beach property.2 1 Although each has its
they who have felt the life-giving touch of its healing waters and its clear dust-free air.
Appearing constantly to change, it remains ever essentially the same.
Id. at 58-59, 190 So. at 448-49.
15. See State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 599, 462 P.2d 671, 678 (1969) (ruling
upholding public easement in dry sand area merely confirmed a public right).
16. See Eckhardt, supra note 9, at 980 (Beach access cases "take into account the special char-
acter of the beach and the public interest therein.").
17. Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & Ald. 268, 275, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190, 1193 (K.B. 1821) (Best, J.,
dissenting).
18. See T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 254.
19. An open beach policy would combine judicial decisions and legislation to protect the rights
of public access and use of the beaches, prohibit interference with these rights, and authorize the
acquisition of accessways. The phrase "open beach" is taken from proposed federal legislation. See
infra note 295.
20. Most North Carolinians already "consider the [beaches] to be open [to the public] at least
up to the frontal dunes." T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 2, at 253. Indeed, vacationers using the
North Carolina beaches "do not stay seaward of the high-water mark." Id. Of North Carolina's 308
miles of ocean shoreline, 148 miles are publicly owned. UNrTED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COM-
MERCE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, PROPOSED COASTAL MANAGEMENT PRO-
GRAM FOR THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 120 (1978). For most of these public beaches, public
access is not a problem. Id. Likewise, public access to the 160 miles of privately owned beaches
traditionally has not been denied. Id. at 121. Perhaps because of this, "no provisions have been
made to insure [sic] that [public access] will not be a problem in the future." Id.
21. See Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970) (per
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unique elements of proof, the common underlying assumption is that customary
use by the public of beach property can evolve into a public right.22 This section
discusses representative cases under each theory and analyzes relevant North
Carolina law.
A. Prescriptive Easements2
3
A prescriptive easement is an easement in the land of another acquired
through continuous use.24 Prescription means literally "before written,"25 and
the common-law theory was that use for a long period of time raised a presump-
tion that the user "had at some past time received a grant of the. . . interest
used."'26 Thus, a long, continuous, and peaceable use was necessary to establish
a prescriptive right.27 Most American courts, however, have equated prescrip-
tion with adverse possession 28 and have required the use to be continuous, unin-
terrupted,29 adverse, 30 under a claim of right,3 1 and for a statutory period of
time.32
curiam) (public rights to use and access beach held established by implied dedication); City of Day-
tona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974) (observation tower on beach held not
inconsistent with public's prescriptive rights of use); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462
P.2d 671 (1969) (public rights of use established by custom); Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375
S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (public held to have prescriptive rights in beach). For an interest-
ing discussion of the development of the "common law" of beach access and its economic efficiency,
see Roberts, Beache" The Efficiency of the Common Law and Other Fairy Tales, 28 UCLA L. REv.
169, 170-87 (1980).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 24, 75, & 105.
23. For a general discussion of prescriptive easements in beaches, see Degnan, Public Rights in
Ocean Beaches: A Theory of Prescription, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 935 (1973).
24. 3 R. PowELL, supra note 10, 413, at 34-103 to -104.
25. Id. at 34-103.
26. Stoebuck, The Fiction of Presumed Grant, 15 U. KAN. L. REv. 17, 20 (1966). Long use was
defined as use going back to the "limit of English legal memory," which was 1189. Id. at 19. This
was the same time period necessary to establish a custom. See infra note 104. In order to perpetuate
the fiction, however, the English courts "created a further presumption" that "proof of user as far
back as living witnesses could recall showed user on back to 1189." Stoebuck, supra, at 20.
27. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 10, 413, at 34-103 n.3.
28. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.7, at 451
(1984). Technically, adverse possession involves ownership, whereas prescription involves use. Id.
at 451-52.
29. 3 R. POWELL, supra note 10, % 413, at 34-124 to -128. "Continuous" refers to the easement
claimant's behavior and activity. "Uninterrupted" refers to the behavior and activity of the land-
owner. . WEBsTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 321, at 345-46 (1981).
30. Adverse use is use "not... made in subordination to [the landowner]." 3 R. POWELL,
supra note 10, 1 413, at 34-107 to -13. This definition, however, does not requke that the "user's
intent... violate another's rights." Id. at 34-112.
31. A claim of right is merely the nonrecognition of the owner's authority either to prevent or
permit the use. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 458 comment c (1944); see also Potts v. Burnette,
301 N.C. 663, 668, 273 S.E.2d 285, 289 (1981) ("Although there was no evidence that plaintiffs
thought they owned the road, . . . [they] considered their use of [it] to be a right and not a
privilege.").
32. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 460 (1944). The statutory period varies from state to state,
but is usually between five and twenty-five years. See 3 R. POWELL, supra note 10, 413, at 34-130
to -131 nn.58-59. Most courts have applied adverse possession statutes by analogy to create the
prescriptive period. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.52, at 267 (A. Casner ed. 1952); see, eg.,
Dickinson v. Pake, 284 N.C. 576, 201 S.E.2d 897 (1974) (court used adverse possession statute to
establish prescriptive period of twenty years).
1985]
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In City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc.,3 3 the First District Court of
Appeals of Florida found a prescriptive easement in favor of the public in appel-
lee's oceanfront property.34 The City of Daytona Beach had granted a building
permit to an amusement corporation, allowing the corporation to build an obser-
vation tower on the corporation's beach property. A group of local citizens
sought to enjoin the construction, claiming public use established a prescriptive
easement in the property.3 5 In finding for plaintiffs the court stated that the
public had "continuously and uninterruptedly used and enjoyed the soft sand
area of the beach. . . as a recreation area" for more than twenty years.36 Spo-
radic exercises of authority by the property owners were insufficient to preserve
their rights against the public.37
The Florida Supreme Court reversed,38 however, holding that the public's
use of the beach property was not against the owners' interests but "in further-
ance" of them.39 Although it acknowledged that prescriptive easements could
arise in beaches, 4° the court concluded that because the property owners oper-
ated an oceanfront business open to the public, they had not lost anything by
public use of the beach; thus, there was no invasion of the owners' right to the
property.4 1 "Unless the owner loses something," the court stated, the "public
[can] obtain no easement by prescription." 42
Several considerations militate against the use of prescription to establish
public rights in beach property. The first problem with prescription, evidenced
by Tona-Rama, occurs when the property owner operates an oceanfront busi-
ness, open to the public. In such cases, the court may hold that public use fur-
thers the interests of the property owner and thus fails to meet the requirement
of adverse use. The second problem is that of establishing the evidence of ad-
verse use needed to create a public beach easement. Because the easement is in
33. 271 So. 2d 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (on rehearing), rev'd, 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974).
34. Id. at 770.
35. Id. at 766.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 767. Other Florida cases have recognized the concept of a prescriptive easement in
beach property. See City of Miami Beach v. Undercliff Realty & Inv. Co., 155 Fla. 805, 21 So. 2d
783 (1945); City of Miami Beach v. Miami Beach Improvement Assoc., 153 Fla. 107, 14 So. 2d 172
(1943). The court in both cases, however, declined to find prescriptive easements because of the
absence of adverseness in the public's use of private beach land.
38. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Raina, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 78 (Fla. 1974). For a further
discussion of this case see Note, Doctrine of Customary Rights-Customary Public Use of Privately
Owned Beach Precludes Activity of Owner Inconsistent with Public Interest, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 806
(1974).
39. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 77 (Fla. 1974). The court also
noted that even if a prescriptive easement were found, defendants' observation tower would not be
inconsistent with the public use and could remain on the beach. Id.
40. Id. at 75.
41. Id. at 78. Specifically, the use was not adverse to the owner.
42. Id. at 77; see also Spiegle v. Borough of Beach Haven, 116 N.J. Super. 148, 158, 281 A.2d
377, 382 (1971) (use of unimproved land presumed permissive when there is "no actual deprivation
of any beneficial use to the owner"). Not all courts require evidence that the property owner lost
something. In North Carolina, however, the presumption of permissive use suggests that when a
landowner benefits from public use of the upland, a claimant must show a loss to the landowner's
interests by use of the dry-sand area in order to overcome the presumption that the public's use was
permissive. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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favor of the public, copious evidence of continuous public use must be pro-
duced. 43 Evidence of use by isolated individuals will not be sufficient.44 A third
problem with prescription is that easement rights can be established only in the
particular piece of property that is the subject of the litigation.45 At least one
court has been deterred from relying on prescription because of the possibility
that doubtful prescription cases could "fill the courts for years with tract-by-
tract litigation." 46
Finally, given the seasonal nature of recreational use of the beach, proving
continuous, uninterrupted use may be a problem. Courts that have recognized
prescriptive easements in beach property, however, have found ways to avoid
this problem. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals, for example, found evidence of
seasonal use of the beach sufficient to establish continuous use.47 The lack of
any evidence of swimming during the winter months was not dispositive because
"it is a matter of common knowledge that climatic conditions are certainly suita-
ble for swimming. . . six months of the year."' 48 The public, therefore, was
limited to use of the beach for swimming during those months when it was cli-
matically possible; nonuse during the other months did not cause the claim to
fail for lack of continuous use. North Carolina case law on prescriptive ease-
ments supports the Texas court's analysis.49 The North Carolina Supreme
Court has stated that "possession must be continuous, though not necessarily
unceasing, for the statutory period, and of such character as to subject the prop-
43. The easement must be used by members of the public, not just isolated individuals. 2
AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 32, § 9.50c, at 483. Public use, however, has been de-
fined as use by persons who are not separable from the public generally. Olsen v. Erie R.R. Co., 99
N.J.L. 485, 487, 124 A. 367, 368 (1924). Establishing evidence of public use may be particularly
problematic in the case of remote beaches. See Texas Law Institute of Coastal and Marine Re-
sources, The Beaches: Public Rights and Private Use (Conference Proceedings, Jan. 15, 1972)
("[The Texas Court of Civil Appeals' decision in Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964)] might not be sufficient ... to protect some of the slightly more remote
beaches .... There might not be a similarly clear long [public] use to establish a prescriptive right
44. 2 AMnIUCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 32, § 9.50c, at 483.
45. See State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 595, 462 P.2d 671, 676 (1969); see also City
of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So. 2d 765, 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (on rehearing)
(emphasizing that ruling applies only to disputed tract), rev'd, 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974).
46. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 595, 462 P.2d 671, 676 (1969). The court relied
instead on custom. Other courts, although finding prescriptive easements, have not based their hold-
ings on them. See Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 38, 465 P.2d 50, 55, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162,
167 (1970) (per curiam) (court recognized prescription as an alternative basis for its holding); Sea-
way Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (court recognized a prescriptive
easement in dry-sand beach, but based holding on implied dedication).
47. Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923, 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). Evidence
showed that the beach was used heavily during the summer months for fishing, swimming, and
general recreation; during the winter months, however, the area was used only for fishing. The court
characterized the evidence as demonstrating "yearly, continuous and indiscriminate use by members
of the general public." Id. at 934; see also Ivons-Nispel, Inc. v. Lowe, 347 Mass. 760, 761, 200
N.E.2d 282, 283 (1964) (use from summer to summer held to be sufficient). But see Speigle v.
Borough of New Haven, 116 N.J. Super. 148, 281 A.2d 377 (1971) (seasonal fishing, swimming, and
sunbathing not sufficient).
48. Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923, 934 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). The essence of
the court's argument was that because the ocean is unsuitable for swimming six months of the year,
the public's nonuse of it for swimming during the winter months did not evidence a lapse in the
public's claim.
49. See, eg., Vance v. Guy, 223 N.C. 409, 27 S.E.2d 117 (1945).
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erty to the only use of which it is susceptible."'50
North Carolina law, however, poses additional problems to the use of pre-
scription for beach access. The permissive presumption rule, which creates a
presumption that use is permissive until the contrary is shown, 51 makes it diffi-
cult to establish adverse use. The analogy of prescription to adverse possession 52
and North Carolina's recognition of "neighborly courtesy" 53 may account for
the presumption, but it is more likely that the courts, traditional guardians of
private property, are cautious about granting the public rights in such property.
The North Carolina courts also require that one claiming a prescriptive
easement produce evidence that use was confined to a definite and specific
area. 54 Furthermore, although there may be "slight deviations in the [area] of
travel there must be. . .substantial identity" of the easement claimed. 55 When
50. Id. at 413, 27 S.E.2d at 120; see also Dickinson v. Pake, 284 N.C. 576, 581, 201 S.E.2d 897,
901 (1974) (" 'The continuity required is that the use be exercised more or less frequently, according
to the purpose and nature of the easement' ") (quoting J. WEBSTER, supra note 29, § 288).
51. Dickinson v. Pake, 284 N.C. 576, 580, 201 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1974); accord Speight v. Ander-
son, 226 N.C. 492, 39 S.E.2d 371 (1946); Darr v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 215 N.C. 768, 3 S.E.2d
434 (1939); Perry v. White, 185 N.C. 79, 116 S.E. 84 (1923); Nash v. Shute, 184 N.C. 383, 114 S.E.
470 (1922); State v. Norris, 174 N.C. 808, 93 S.E. 950 (1917); Snowden v. Bell, 159 N.C. 497, 75 S.E.
721 (1912). This presumption is contrary to common law and does not exist in the majority of
states. G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 337, at 175,
§ 350, at 292-95 (1961). When unenclosed land is involved, however, many jurisdictions that nor-
mally apply the common-law presumption of hostile use will apply the presumption of permissive
use. Id. § 350, at 306 ("Courts more readily infer an adverse user when the way passes through
inclosed land than when it runs across open territory."); see, eg., Boullioun v. Constantine, 186 Ark.
625, 54 S.W.2d 986 (1932) (use of unenclosed land presumed permissive); Todd v. Sterling, 45 Wash.
2d 40, 273 P.2d 245 (1954) (use of unenclosed land presumed permissive); see also Spiegle v. Bor-
ough of Beach Haven, 116 NJ. Super. 148, 158, 281 A.2d 377, 382 (1971) ("Wlihere land is in a
general state of nature and left unimproved by its owner, sporadic or even customary use of such
property by a mere user is presumably permissive if there has been no actual deprivation of any
beneficial use to the owner."). For a more detailed discussion of the development of the presumption
in North Carolina, see Dickinson v. Pake, 284 N.C. 576, 201 S.E.2d 897 (1974). The North Carolina
Supreme Court in Potts v. Burnette, 301 N.C. 663, 273 S.E.2d 285 (1981) refused to adopt the
common-law presumption of hostile use, adhering instead to the presumption of permissive use.
The theory of permissive use holds that when an owner gives no objection to use of the prop-
erty, the owner is giving permission. See Henry v. Farlow, 238 N.C. 542, 544, 78 S.E.2d 244, 245
(1953) ("[The] circumstance that the owners of the soil did not object to the use of the way harmo-
nizes with the theory that they permitted use of the way."). A recent North Carolina Supreme
Court decision, however, suggests a narrower reading of the presumption. In West v. Slick, 313
N.C. 33, 326 S.E.2d 601 (1985), testimony established that on several occasions a guard employed by
respondents to prohibit public access over their property had opened a gate for a traveler who in-
sisted that he was going to cross respondents' property. The court held that this evidence was suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption of permissive use. Id. at 52, 326 S.E.2d at 612. A witness' statement
that he "was not given permission to go through [the gate]," id., apparently overcame the
presumption.
52. See Potts v. Burnette, 301 N.C. 663, 667, 273 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1981) ("An easement by
prescription, like adverse possession, is not favored in the law .... "); see generally Note, Prescrip-
tive Acquisition in North Carolina, 45 N.C.L. REv. 284, 287-95 (1966) (discussion of development of
prescription in North Carolina).
53. See Weaver v. Pitts, 191 N.C. 747, 749, 133 S.E. 2, 3 (1926) ("It is only when the use of the
path or road is clearly adverse to the owner or the land, and not an enjoyment of neighborly cour-
tesy" that a prescriptive easement can be found.). Neighborly courtesy encourages landowners not
to fence in their property.
54. Speight v. Anderson, 226 N.C. 492, 496, 39 S.E.2d 371, 374 (1946); Cahoon v. Roughton,
215 N.C. 116, 119, 1 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1939).
55. Dickinson v. Pake, 284 N.C. 576, 581, 201 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1974); accord Hemphill v.
Board of Aldermen, 212 N.C. 185, 188, 193 S.E. 153, 155 (1937).
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the easement is for use of the dry-sand area, there should be no problem with
identification. 56 Coastal dynamics (shifting sands and storms), however, may
make identification of a particular strip of upland difficult.
A recent North Carolina Supreme Court decision, West v. Slick,57 applied
the "substantial identity" test to beach land in the North Carolina Outer Banks.
Petitioners sought to restrain respondents from blocking public access across
respondents' beach property.58 They also sought to establish two roads across
the land as neighborhood public roads and as public roads by prescription or
dedication. The first road, the "Inside Road," ran along the inside of the outer
banks along the Currituck Sound.5 9 The second road, the "Pole Line Road,"
was located behind the sand dune line on the ocean side of the banks. 6° The
North Carolina Court of Appeals had found the evidence insufficient as a matter
of law to establish the location of either roadway with reasonable certainty. 6x
The supreme court, however, relying on aerial photographs and testimony of
local residents, held that the evidence of substantial identity was sufficient to
take the case to the jury.62 The court found that the location of the Inside Road
had never deviated; 63 the location of the Pole Line Road had deviated, but the
court held that the deviation was slight and therefore within the requirements of
the substantial identity test.64
56. The dry-sand beach is always defined by the high-tide and vegetation lines. To find a pre-
scriptive easement in this area, however, it might be necessary for the North Carolina courts to
adopt the concept of a "rolling easement." An easement in the dry-sand area naturally follows the
shoreline as the line of mean low water changes from time to time by the natural forces of erosion.
This concept of a rolling or shifting easement was first applied in Mercer v. Denne, [1905] 2 Ch. 538,
in which the court held that a right to dry fishing nets on a beach attached to a new beach area
created by accretion. It also has been applied in two Texas district court cases. See Feinman v.
State, No. 125,882 (Dist. Ct. of Galveston County, 10th Judicial Dist. of Texas, 1984); Galveston
East Beach, Inc. v. State, No. 93,893 (Dist. Ct. of Galveston County, 10th Judicial Dist. of Texas,
1964).
The North Carolina Supreme Court implicitly recognized a rolling easement in Carolina Beach
Fishing Pier v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 573 (1970). The court stated that
"[i]t is a general rule that where the location of the margin... of a... body of water... is
gradually and imperceptibly changed or shifted by accretion, reliction, or erosion, the margin... as
so changed remains the boundary line. ... Id. at 304, 177 S.E.2d at 517 (quoting 56 AM. JuR.
Waters § 477 (1947)). Thus, plaintiff's land was held to have been reclaimed by the sea, its title
divested by the tides. Id.
57. 313 N.C. 33, 326 S.E.2d 601 (1985).
58. Respondents' property was sand dune and marsh property that comprised four miles of the
outer banks between the Currituck-Dare County line and the Village of Corolla. Id. at 37, 326
S.E.2d at 603-04.
59. Id. at 41, 326 S.E.2d at 606.
60. Id. at 43, 326 S.E.2d at 606.
61. West v. Slick, 60 N.C. App. 345, 348, 299 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1983), rev'd, 313 N.C. 33, 326
S.E.2d 601 (1985). The court of appeals apparently interchanged the terms "reasonable certainty"
and "substantial identity."
62. Slick, 313 N.C. at 45, 326 S.E.2d at 608.
63. Id. at 44-45, 326 S.E.2d at 608.
64. Id. The road's location along established telephone line poles may have aided identifica-
tion. The court cited testimony and aerial photographs as the bases for its holding and noted that
"[a]lthough the blowing sand sometimes filled the tracks, the roadway was always discernible." Id.
at 44, 326 S.E.2d at 608; cf. Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923, 939 (rex. Civ. App.
1964) (" he line of vegetation and the line of low tide mark the route... . The nature of the
terrain and the use made gave sufficient notice to the owner of the extent and location of the route
claimed.").
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The Slick decision suggests that the North Carolina Supreme Court will
apply the substantial identity test liberally when considering beach easements.65
Although the easements at issue were not accessways to the beach, but rather
roadways for local residents, their location on the dry-sand beach provides an
analogy to beach access cases. The Slick decision, however, merely clarifies one
aspect of North Carolina prescriptive easement requirements and is not helpful
in predicting how the other elements will be applied to beach access cases. A
beach access claimant still faces the difficult task of proving adverse use and of
overcoming the North Carolina presumption of permissive use. Success on these
issues, of course, will depend on the particular facts of each case. Establishing
an easement by prescription, however, is burdensome, uncertain, and not judi-
cially favored in North Carolina.6 6 For these reasons this Comment does not
recommend it as a judicial tool for establishing beach access in North Carolina.
B. Implied Dedication67
Dedication is the devotion of land to a public use by an "unequivocal mani-
festation" 68 of the fee owner that the dedication be accepted and used for such
public use.69 An implied dedication is one in which the intention to dedicate is
inferred from the acts and conduct of the landowner.70 Intent to dedicate con-
stitutes the "offer" of dedication; "acceptance" must be demonstrated by the
party seeking to establish the dedication. 71 Acceptance may be demonstrated by
a formal public act or may be inferred from the conduct of a municipality or, in
some cases, solely from the conduct of the public. 72 Failure to prove acceptance
precludes a finding of dedication. 73
Although the most common dedications are easements for streets, alleys,
and highways, implied dedication also has been used to secure public access to
beach land.74 Continuous, uninterrupted public use of a specific beach may give
65. Petitioners' position in Slick, however, was especially compelling because the accessways in
question provided the only available vehicular access to and from the Village of Corolla and the
northern reaches of the Currituck outer banks. Slick, 313 N.C. at 38, 326 S.E.2d at 604. Claimants
of beach accessways for public recreational use would not have so compelling a claim.
66. See Potts v. Burnette, 301 N.C. 663, 667, 273 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1981).
67. Because it does not depend on public use, express dedication is not discussed in this
Comment. An express dedication occurs when a landowner "explicitly [specifies] the interest he is
dedicating." R. Cu NnIGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WmrmAN supra note 28, § 11.6, at 753. For
an example of a beach access case relying on express dedication, see Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach,
69 Misc. 2d 760, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (by opening beach to public in 1936, city
expressly dedicated it), aff'd mem., 45 A.D.2d 841, 358 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1974). For discussion of
express dedication and beach access in North Carolina, see R. DucKER, supra note 8, at 155-61.
68. 6A R. POWELL, supra note 10, 926(2), at 84-85.
69. Id. % 926(1), at 83-84.
70. 4 H. TIPFANY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1101, at 574 (3d ed. 1939).
71. 6A R. PowEu., REAL PROPERTY, supra note 10, 1 926(2), at 84-85.
72. Id.
73. "If dedications became final by the mere act of dedication. . . several problems might
arise. The interest dedicated may be unclear; so that public or private beneficiaries cannot rely on,
improperly rely on or are forced to litigation in order to rely on the dedication." D. HAoMAN,
URBAN PLANNING & LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 140, at 260 (1975).
74. 4 H. TIFANY, supra note 70, § 1098 at 562.
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rise to an inference that the owner intended to open the land to the public.75
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals first applied the implied dedication doctrine to
beaches in Seaway Co. v. Attorney GeneraL76 Acting under a state statute,77 the
Texas Attorney General sought to prohibit Seaway from obstructing the dry-
sand beach. 78 The court found unrestricted public recreational use of the beach
for over one hundred years7 9 and held that Seaway had made an implied dedi-
cation to the public. 80 Similarly, the California Supreme Court has recognized
the implied dedication of beach property used by the public as a recreational
area for over five years.8 1
One recurring criticism of implied dedication is its inequity to landown-
ers.8 2 Similarly situated landowners may be treated differently simply because
75. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970) (per
curiam). While anyone can acquire an interest in land by adverse possession or prescription, only
the public can acquire rights by dedication. See 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 70, § 1098, at 562.
76. 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
77. TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 61.013, 61.018 (Vernon 1978). The statute makes it an
offense to obstruct ingress to and egress from or use of the beach and authorizes the Attorney Gen-
eral to bring suit to remove any obstruction. For further discussion of the Texas statute, see infra
notes 299-305 and accompanying text.
78. Seaway, 375 S.W.2d at 926. Seaway had placed barriers on the dry-sand beach.
79. Id. at 933-34. The court did not appear to be establishing a minimum time period in em-
phasizing one hundred years of use. Compare Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 39, 465 P.2d
50, 55, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 167 (1970) (per curiam) (five years is minirum time period necessary to
establish dedication) with State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 147, 594 P.2d 1093, 1100
(1979) (five years of uninterrupted public use insufficient to imply dedication).
80. Seaway, 375 S.W.2d at 940. The court applied road and highway cases to the beach context
in reaching its holding.
81. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 35,465 P.2d 50, 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171 (1970)
(per curiam). In Gion two cases were consolidated for trial. The first case, Gion v. City of Santa
Cruz, involved privately owned upland beach lots that had been used by the public as a parking,
beach, and picnic area. Id. at 34, 465 P.2d at 53, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 165. The second case, Dietz v.
King, involved a small peninsula and the access road to it. Id. at 36, 465 P.2d at 54, 84 Cal. Rptr. at
166. Although both areas had been used by the public for recreation for at least one hundred years,
id., the court stated that only five years of use would be required to establish an implied dedication.
Id. at 39, 465 P.2d at 56, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
The landowners' intent to donate the land to public use was somewhat ambiguous. For exam-
ple, in the first case, the owner occasionally posted "No Trespassing" signs. Id. at 34-35, 465 P.2d at
53, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 165. The owners in Dietz had an unlocked chain across the road and occasion-
ally blocked access with barriers and charged an admission fee. Id. at 37-38, 465 P.2d at 55, 84 Cal.
Rptr. at 167. The court held that although the present owners had no dedicatory intent, their prede-
cessors in title had, by their intent, impliedly dedicated the property. Id. at 39, 465 P.2d at 56, 84
Cal. Rptr. at 168.
A controversial decision, Gion has been the subject of much commentary. See, ag., Armstrong,
(lion v. City of Santa Cruz: Now You Own It-Now You Don't" or The Case of the Reluctant Philan-
thropist, 45 L.A.B. BULL. 529 (1970); Berger, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: A License to Steal?, 49
CAL. ST. B.J. 24 (1974); Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last-At Least They Lose Their Property: (-ion v.
City of Santa Cruz, 8 CAL. W.L. REv. 75 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Berger, Nice Guys finish Last];
Gallagher, Jure & Agnew, Implied Dedication: The Imaginary Waves ofGion-Dietz, 5 Sw. L. REv.
48 (1973); Shavelson, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: Where Do We Go From Here?, 47 CAL. ST. BJ.
415 (1972); Comment, A Threat to the Owners of California's Shoreline, 11 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
327 (1971); Note, The Common Law Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its Effect on the California
Coastline Property Owners, 4 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 438 (1971); Note, This Land Is My Lanc" The
Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its Application to California Beaches, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1092
(1971); Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REv. 564 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Public Access to Beaches].
82. See Comment, Public or Private Ownership of Beache" An Alternative to Implied Dedica-
tion, 18 UCLA L. REv. 795, 804-08 (1975). But see Note, Public Access to Beaches: Common Law
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the public used one area of the beach and not another.8 3 Depending on the
extent of the easement, a landowner may be forced to leave all or part of the
property undeveloped because development would interfere with the free exer-
cise of the easement rights.8 4 Finally, after implied dedication is found, the
landowner is no longer able to convey an unencumbered title to the property. 85
Although these same inequities result under prescription, they seem especially
harsh with respect to the implied dedication landowner who was, after all, the
generous owner.
A second criticism of implied dedication is that it encourages landowners to
take positive action to exclude the public from their land.8 6 This was the ironic
aftermath of Gion v. City of Santa Cruz.8 7 Following the decision, beach prop-
erty owners constructed chain link fences, dynamited beach access paths, and
planted cacti to preserve their property rights.88
To establish an implied dedication in North Carolina, a claimant must
show that the dedication was accepted in a "recognized legal manner."8 9 In
many jurisdictions "public user"9 0-the actual enjoyment of property-is con-
Doctrines and Constitutional Challenges, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 368, 374 (1973) ("[The] beach owner
has actually lost ... relatively little.").
83. This may not necessarily occur because one landowner intends to dedicate and the other
does not. Some beach property is simply more attractive or more accessible than other property.
The Oregon Supreme Court in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969),
relied on the doctrine of custom rather than on implied dedication or prescription to avoid inequity.
84. The landowner's development may be able to coexist with the easement. See, ag., City of
Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 77 (Fla. 1974) (landowner's observation tower
held not to interfere in any way with public's use of beach).
85. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 28, § 8.10.
86. Such action, however, may not preclude a finding of intent to dedicate if a court finds such
intent on the part of the landowner's predecessors in title. See supra note 81.
87. 2 Cal. 3d 29, 35, 465 P.2d 50, 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171 (1970) (per curiam).
88. Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last, supra note 81, at 84. One commentator called on the public
and on state and local governments to fight such efforts immediately. His battle plan was as follows:
[Llawsuits should be brought now to confirm public easements wherever they have been
created through past use. These easements will severely diminish the development value of
beach property, since improvements that conflict with recreational use can be enjoined.
Once an easement by use has been established, state or local government can assure com-
plete public ownership by condemning the land at its reduced value. If landowner pressure
inhibits governmental action, citizens' groups may bring class suits, as in Dietz.
Note, Public Access to Beaches, supra note 81, at 586.
A California decision following Gion-Dietz must have provided some comfort to concerned
landowners. In County of Orange v. Chandler-Sherman Corp., 54 Cal. App. 3d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr.
765 (1976), the court stated that "so long as the property was not being damaged [by public use] and
no public nuisance was being created, it was unnecessary for the owner to install chain link fences or
hire armed guards to protect his beach from the onslaught of the public." Id. at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr.
at 769. The court distinguished Gion-Dietz, finding the use at issue to be by smaller numbers of
people for shorter periods of time, id. at 566-67, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 768-69, and characterizing the use
as "casual," rather than "major or substantial." Id. at 566, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 768. Furthermore,
although the owner's attempts to stop public use through sporadic use of signs and guards were not
"highly efficient," the court said that because the area was largely in a natural state only a minimum
effort to control public use was necessary. Id. at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
89. Emanuelson v. Gibbs, 49 N.C. App. 417, 425, 271 S.E.2d 557, 569 (1980); accord, Owens v.
Elliott, 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 583 (1962); Gault v. Town of Lake Waccamaw, 200 N.C. 593, 158
S.E. 104 (1931); Wright v. Town of Lake Waccamaw, 200 N.C. 616, 158 S.E. 99 (1931).
90. "User" means "the actual exercise or enjoyment of any right [or] property." BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1383 (5th ed. 1979). The term is preferred in implied dedication and prescriptive
easement cases because it "conveys the idea of use that establishes a property right." Livingston,
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sidered a recognized legal manner.91 Although it is not always clear what con-
stitutes acceptance in North Carolina, cases involving implied dedication of
streets and highways suggest that public user alone is not sufficient; 92 it must be
accompanied by assertion of control over the street or highway by the munici-
pality. 93 The rationale is that because creation of a public highway imposes a
maintenance duty on the public,94 the municipal authorities, as the public's rep-
resentatives, must "accept" the duty.95
If no duty of maintenance is imposed on the municipality, is public user
Public Access to Firginia's Tidelands: A Framework for Analysis of Implied Dedications and Public
Prescriptive Rights, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 669, 691 n.84 (1983).
91. In the following cases public user was recognized as sufficient acceptance of an implied offer
of dedication of beach property: Los Angeles County v. Berk, 26 Cal. 3d 201, 605 P.2d 381, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 742, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980); Long Beach v. Daugherty, 75 Cal. App. 3d 972, 142
Cal. Rptr. 593 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 823 (1978); Hollywood, Inc. v. Zinkil, 403 So. 2d 528
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Miami v. Eastern Realty Co., 202 So. 2d 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967),
cert. denied, 210 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1967); Darlington County v. Perkins, 269 S.C. 572, 239 S.E.2d 69
(1977); Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372 (rex. Civ. App. 1979).
In the following cases, public user of beach property was held not to be sufficient acceptance of
an implied offer of dedication: Miami Beach v. Undercliff Realty & Inv. Co., 155 Fla. 805,21 So. 2d
783 (1945); Miami Beach v. Miami Beach Improvement Co., 153 Fla. 107, 14 So. 2d 172 (1943);
Lines v. State, 245 Ga. 390, 264 S.E.2d 891 (1980); Department of Natural Resources v. Ocean City,
274 Md. 1, 332 A.2d 630 (1975); Department of Natural Resources v. Cropper, 274 Md. 25, 332
A.2d 644 (1975); Kempf v. Ellixson, 69 Mich. App. 339, 244 N.W.2d 476 (1976); McInnis v. Town
of Hampton, 112 N.H. 57, 288 A.2d 691 (1972); Murphy v. Point Pleasant Beach, 123 NJ.L. 88, 8
A.2d 116 (1939), aff'd 124 N.J.L. 565, 12 A.2d 891 (1940); State v. Beach Co., 271 S.C. 425, 248
S.E.2d 115 (1978).
Under English common law, public user alone was sufficient to constitute acceptance. See W.
BSr, A T1R)ATS ON PRESUMPTIONS OF LAW AND FACr § 101 (1845).
[Tihe fact of dedication may... be... inferred from circumstances.... among the
foremost of which is that of permissive user on the part of the public. If a man open his
land so that the public pass over it continually, the public, after a user of a very few years
will acquire a right of way ....
Id. An early Virginia case declared this rule to be inapplicable in this country. See Commonwealth
v. Kelly, 49 Va. 700, 8 Gratt. 632 (1851). The court's reasoning was as follows:
In England the price of land is high and owners prohibit with great care all trespasses upon
it. And in that country it may be that it rarely happens that an owner permits a free
passage over his land, without intending to dedicate it as a road to the public... In this
country the price of land is not high, nor do owners of it guard against trespasses on it with
the same care; and it is known to all who have lived in the country, that until a recent
period, owners frequently permitted roads to be opened through their forests and other
lands not in cultivation without the least intention of dedicating these roads to the public.
Id. at 701-02, 8 Gratt. at 635. It is doubtful that this reasoning could apply in a modem beach
access case given the high price of most oceanfront property.
92. In one North Carolina case, the supreme court stated that acceptance could be found
"under certain circumstances, by user as of by right on the part of the public." Town of Blowing
Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 368, 90 S.E.2d 898, 900 (1956). Although the court's language
suggests that user alone may be sufficient "under certain circumstances," the court did not rely on
user alone in Blowing Rock. Evidence showed that the municipality had maintained and repaired
the dedicated road. Id. at 367, 90 S.E.3d at 900.
93. See Owens v. Elliott, 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 583 (1962); Rowe v. City of Durham, 235
N.C. 158, 69 S.E.2d 171 (1952); Lee v. Walker, 234 N.C. 687, 68 S.E.2d 664 (1951); Gault v. Town
of Lake Waccamaw, 200 N.C. 593, 158 S.E. 104 (1931); Irwin v. City of Charlotte, 193 N.C. 109,
136 S.E. 368 (1927); Emanuelson v. Gibbs, 49 N.C. App. 417, 271 S.E.2d 557 (1980).
94. See Owens v. Elliott, 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 583 (1962); Emanuelson v. Gibbs, 49 N.C.
App. 417, 271 S.E.2d 557 (1980).
95. One commentator suggests that the public is the municipality and the municipal authorities
merely the agents of the public. Under this view, user alone should be sufficient. 11 E. McQtuLLiN,
MuNicAL CORPORArIONS § 33.50 (3d ed. 1949).
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sufficient to establish public beach accessways in North Carolina? The courts
have not ruled on this point. The issue whether public user alone is sufficient
when no duty is imposed on the municipality is unlikely to arise in North Caro-
lina with respect to roads or highways, because the existence of a road or high-
way96 by definition imposes the duty.97 If the maintenance requirement is
applicable to beaches, unless a municipality has asserted some control over a
beach accessway, implied dedication for public use will not be found in North
Carolina. A claimant might argue that beach accessways do not impose a bur-
den on a municipality to maintain the physical features of the accessway because
coastal dynamics prevent even the landowner from maintaining the beach prop-
erty in any consistent manner. When the proffered accessway is the dry-sand
beach, this argument is reasonable.
In addition to the duty of physical maintenance, the municipality also is
subject to tort liability for failure to maintain an accessway properly.9 8 The
position of the North Carolina courts appears to be that this tort liability should
be assumed only by voluntary acceptance of the dedication by the proper au-
thorities. If this is the case, public user alone should not constitute effective
acceptance of an implied dedication in North Carolina.
Implied dedication is ill suited to achieve an open beach policy in North
Carolina. First, it unfairly penalizes one beach property owner over another.
Second, it may frustrate its own objective if formerly open beach property is
closed due to landowners' reactions to court decisions. Third, public user is not
sufficient evidence of acceptance. 99
96. A highway includes carriageways, bridleways, and footways. Parsons v. Wright, 223 N.C.
520, 521, 27 S.E.2d 534, 536 (1943).
97. See Owens v. Elliott, 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 583 (1962) (although no evidence that
municipality would be liable for maintenance, court assumed such liability). Cases involving roads
and highways have held that there can be no public road or highway in North Carolina unless it is
(1) established by the public authorities in a proceeding regularly instituted before the proper tribu-
nat; (2) generally used by the public and over which the proper authorities have asserted control for
at least twenty years; or (3) dedicated to the public by the landowner with the sanction of the author-
ities and their acceptance of the responsibilities of repair and maintenance. Id. at 317, 128 S.E.2d at
586 (quoting Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C. 289, 291, 29 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1944)). Chesson involved
prescriptive easements, not dedications. The law of prescription often appears in North Carolina
dedication cases, confusing the holdings. For further discussion of these dedication cases, see Note,
Acceptance of Streets in Subdivisons-Public Use, 41 N.C.L. REv. 875, 880-82 (1963).
Similarly, the law of dedication has been applied by some courts in prescription cases. See 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 32, § 9.50, at 485. These courts have required acts of
acceptance by public authorities before the public can claim a prescriptive easement. Id. Most
courts, however, have not required such acceptance, and indeed "there is no sound basis for such a
requirement in order to [find a public easement] ... by prescription." Id.
98. See Note, supra note 97, at 879. This conclusion is supported by present regulations under
the North Carolina Coastal and Estuarine Water Beach Access Program, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 113A-134.1 to -134.3 (1983). The North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission Regulations
provide that "[m]aintenance is the proper upkeep and repair of beach access sites and their facilities
in such a manner that public health and safety is ensured." N.C. Coastal Resources Comm'n Reg.,
15 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 7M.0302(i) (1985) (emphasis added). Another regulation makes clear that
this is a local responsibility: "Maintenance is to be a responsibility of the local government unless
another suitable party is identified." Id. For further discussion of the North Carolina legislation, see
infira notes 317-32 and accompanying text.
99. Implied dedication also has been criticized as a taking without just compensation in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution. See Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last,
supra note 81, at 93-95. For a discussion of taking, see infra notes 205-37 and accompanying text.
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C. Custom
A right to make use of land belonging to another may be acquired by "cus-
tomary use." 10" For example, "it may be a custom for fishermen to dry nets on
certain land," 10 1 or for citizens of a town to use a particular piece of land for
recreation. 102 The custom doctrine developed in England where the practice of
a particular locality, although not written into common law, could become the
law of that place. 1° 3 To achieve the status of law, the custom "'must have
continued from time immemorial, without interruption, and as of right; it must
be certain as to the place, and as to the persons; and it must be certain and
reasonable as to the subject matter or rights created.' "104
Several American jurisdictions have recognized customary use, 1 5 and two,
Oregon"' 6 and Hawaii, 1 7 have used it to establish public access rights in beach
property. In State ex reL Thornton v. Hay' 8 the Supreme Court of Oregon used
custom to establish a public recreational easement in private beach lands."' 9
When a motel owner, William Hay, used logs to enclose his dry-sand beach for
the exclusive use of his guests, he was criticized by politicians, citizens' groups
and newspapers. 11 Hay responded to the criticism by building a more perma-
nent fence; after a winter storm destroyed it, he built another."' The State of
100. 3 H. TIFANY, supra note 70, § 935, at 623.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Graham v. Walker, 78 Conn. 130, 132-33, 61 A. 98, 99 (1905). The theory was that if
there had been usage of a right of way from time immemorial it must have arisen from an act of
Parliament or other public act of which the written record had disappeared. Id. This theory is
similar to the prescription theory of the lost grant. See supra text accompanying note 26. To be
immemorial the custom must have been exercised since "a time where of the memory of a man
runneth not to the contrary." 12 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, CUSTOM AND USAGE 5 (1975).
This requirement was construed to mean from the coronation of Richard I in 1189. Graham, 78
Conn. at 131, 61 A. at 99.
104. 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 70, § 935, at 623 (quoting S. LEAKE, A DIGEST oF THE LAW OF
USES AND PROFITS Op LAND 552 (1888)). This language, quoted often in custom cases, see, eg.,
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 595-97, 462 P.2d 671, 677 (1969), apparently originated
in The Case of Tanistry, Day. 23, 31-32, 80 Eng. Rep. 516, 519-20 (K.B. 1674).
105. See eg., United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769, 772-73 (D.V.L
1974), aff'd, 429 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1975); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73,
78 (Fla. 1974); County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55 Hawaii 176, 181-82, 517 P.2d 57, 61 (1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 595, 462 P.2d 671, 676
(1969); Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
106. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
107. In re Application of Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968) (Hawaii Supreme Court
used custom to hold that upland land grants extended only to vegetation line.). But see Sotomura v.
County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978) (holding that the result inAshford as to grants
registered in the land court constituted an unconstitutional taking without compensation, thereby
effectively limiting the Ashford holding to land grants not registered in the land court).
108. 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
109. For the background of the case see Note, The English Doctrine of Custom in Oregon Prop-
erty Law: State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 4 ENVTL. L. 383, 384-88 (1974); see also McLennan, Public
Patrimony: An Appraisal of Legislation and Common Law Protecting Recreational Values in Ore-
gon's State-Owned Lands and Waters, 4 ENVTL. L. 317,356-64 (1974) (surveys Oregon statutes and
case law that relate to public recreational lands).
110. Note, supra note 109, at 385.
111. Id. at 386.
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Oregon, under the authority of the Oregon Beach Bill,' 12 sought an order for
removal of Hay's fence." 3 In granting the order, the court noted that although
elements of prescription were present, the "most cogent basis" for the decision
was custom.1 14 The requirements of customary use115 were met by public use of
the beach for recreational purposes "running back in time as long as the land has
been inhabited."' 1 6 Evidence of continous use was inherent in the fact that the
beach was suitable for little else but recreational use.
117
The reliance in Thornton on custom instead of prescription or implied dedi-
cation was dictated primarily by the Oregon court's belief that custom could be
applied to all privately owned beaches, not just the disputed tract. 118 The
court's establishment of public rights of access beyond the disputed area, how-
ever, was an expansion of the English doctrine, which limited the application of
a custom to the inhabitants of a particular locality. 119
Thornton is unusual in its use of custom to establish beach access. Most
American jurisdictions have refused to recognize customary rights in beach
property' 20 or in any other property.' 2 1 North Carolina has not expressly ruled
112. OR. REv. STAT. § 390.610 (1983). This bill had languished in committee prior to the con-
troversy over Hay's fence. McLennan, supra note 109, at 356. The ensuing publicity and public
outrage prompted passage of the bill, and the state promptly commenced suit against Hay. Id. at
357-58. The statute provides that when "use has been legally sufficient to create rights or easements
in the public.. . all public rights or easements. . . are confirmed and declared vested exclusively in
the State of Oregon .. " OR. REV. STAT. § 390.610(2), (3) (1983). The Department of Transpor-
tation and the State Land Board are directed to initiate civil suits to protect such interests. Id.
§ 390.620(1).
The constitutionality of the Oregon Beach Bill was tested in Hay v. Bruno, 344 F. Supp. 286 (D.
Or. 1972). The United States District Court for the District of Oregon held that the bill was consti-
tutional and violated no rights of the landowner because he knew his land was used extensively by
the public for vehicular traffic and recreational purposes. Id. at 289.
113. Note, supra note 109, at 386.
114. Thornton, 254 Or. at 595, 462 P.2d at 676.
115. Seven requirements must be met to establish a custom: the use must be (1) ancient, (2)
continuous, (3) peaceable and free from dispute, and (4) reasonable; (5) the area of use must be
certain; (6) the landowner must be obliged to permit the use; and (7) the use must be consistent with
other law. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENrARES *75-*78. For detailed discussions of these require-
ments, see 12 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENOLAND, CUSTOM AND USAGE §§ 406-19 (4th ed. 1975);
Note, supra note 109, at 395-410. One commentator has concluded that the Thornton court had
modified Blackstone's requirements of certainty and consistency, thereby raising significant logical
and constitutional problems. Id. at 384, 399-406.
116. Thornton, 254 Or. at 595, 462 P.2d at 677.
117. "[Ihe public has always made use of the land in a manner appropriate to the land ....
[Tihe character of the land... limits the use thereof to recreational uses connected with the fore-
shore." Id. at 596, 462 P.2d at 677.
118. "An established custom. . . can be proved with reference to a larger region." Id. at 595,
462 P.2d at 676. One commentator has suggested that the doctrine be used to establish statewide
rights of public access. See Comment, Easements Judicial and Legislative Protection of the Public's
Rights in Florida's Beaches, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 586, 590-92 (1973).
119. See Graham v. Walker, 78 Conn. 130, 132, 61 A. 98, 99 (1905); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 115, at *74. The Oregon court recognized that it was extending the traditional rule, but con-
cluded that "a custom, established in fact, can have regional application and be enjoyed by a larger
public than the inhabitants of a single village." Thornton, 254 Or. at 591 n.8, 462 P.2d at 678 n.8.
120. See, eg., Smith v. Bruce, 241 Ga. 133, 146, 244 S.E.2d 559, 569 (1978); Department of
Natural Resources v. Mayor of Ocean City, 274 Md. 1, 12-14, 332 A.2d 630, 637-38 (1975); Gillies
v. Orienta Beach Club, 159 Misc. 675, 289 N.Y.S. 733 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1935), affid, 248 A.D. 623, 288
N.Y.S. 136 (1936). Oregon has refused to recognize customary rights above the dry-sand area. See
State Hwy. Comm'n v. Bauman, 16 Or. 275, 517 P.2d 1202 (1974).
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on custom, but, given the doctrine's rejection elsewhere, North Carolina courts
are unlikely to accept it. Thus, the practical value of custom in the implementa-
tion of an open beach policy is limited. The theory of customary use, however,
is instructive in formulating such a policy because it emphasizes the unique na-
ture of beach land. 122 Under prescription and implied dedication, the nature of
the use establishes and defines the public right. 123 Custom, however, regards the
use as derivative of the land; the nature of the land, not the nature of the use,
defines the public right. 124 Likewise, an open beach policy for North Carolina
should be "alleged in the land" and "not in the person."' 125 Custom, however, is
not the best approach for guaranteeing public access to North Carolina beaches.
The public trust doctrine-the judicial approach suggested by this Comment-
incorporates the "alleged in the land" concept but, unlike custom, is judicially
favored by North Carolina courts, is not traditionally confined to a local area,
and historically is tied to beach areas.
IM. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND PUBLIC AccEss: A JUDICIAL
TOOL FOR NORTH CAROLINA
A. The Public Trust Doctrine
The final common-law tool for providing beach access is also the oldest.
121. See, e.g., Graham v. Walker,'78 Conn. 130, 61 A. 98 (1905); Attorney Gen. v. Tarr, 148
Mass. 309, 19 N.E. 358 (1889); Harris v. Carson, 34 Va. 748, 7 Leigh 632 (1836). Some of these
jurisdictions have held that because it is literally impossible for an American custom to have existed
since time immemorial (before the coronation of Richard I in 1189), the doctrine of custom is inap-
plicable in America. See, e.g., Delaplane v. Crenshaw & Fisher, 56 Va. 880, 14 Gratt 457 (1860).
One solution to this problem is the approach taken by the English court in Leuckhart v. Cooper, 7
Car. & P. 119, 173 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1835). The court stated that "[t]he general law as to a
custom is, that, if you shew its existence at a distant time, and there is no evidence given that, at a
certain time, it did not exist; you may infer that it went back as far as the reign of Richard the First,
which is the time of legal memory." Id. at 126, 173 Eng. Rep. at 56.
Other American jurisdictions have held that custom is an obsolete doctrine because methods
exist for recording rights in land. See, e.g., Gillies v. Orienta Beach Club, 159 Misc. 675, 681, 289
N.Y.S. 733, 739-40 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1935), aff'd, 248 A.D. 623, 288 N.Y.S. 136 (1936). Custom also
has been said to violate the rule against perpetuities. See J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGoAINsT PERPEru-
rrms § 586 (4th ed. 1942).
In Albright v. Cortright, 64 N.J.L. 330,45 A. 634 (1900), a New Jersey court held that rights of
use in the public could not be established by custom because a "custom so general would be indistin-
guishable from the law itself." Id. at 333, 45 A. at 635. The New Jersey Supreme Court has called
custom an "[a]rchaic judicial [response]. . . to modem social problems." Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass'n, 95 NJ. 306, 325, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (1984).
122. See supra note 117.
123. Under prescription, if the use is sufficiently adverse to the landowner, a public right of use is
established. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. Under dedication, if the use is allowed
by the landowner, a public right of use is established. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
124. See Graham v. Walker, 78 Conn. 130, 132, 61 A. 98, 99 (1905) ("A right of way by custom
appertains to a certain district or territory .... It belongs to the inhabitants of that territory,
whether landowners or not.").
125. In Gateward's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 374, 376, 77 Eng. Rep. 344, 345 (K.3. 1607), the court
explained the main difference between custom and prescription: "[A] difference was taken, and
agreed, between a prescription which always is alleged in the person, and a custom, which always
ought to be alleged in the land. . . ."; see also E. BURN, C-HsInn's MoDE N LAw OF REAL
PROPERTY 544 (13th ed. 1982) ("[P]rescription always connects the right with a definite person,
custom connects it with some particular locality.").
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The public trust doctrine developed from Roman 126 and English law, 127 becom-
ing a part of American law during the Revolution.1 28 Public trust theory holds
that the "public [has] certain important rights in the foreshore [which super-
sede] any conflicting rights, including those claimed by the [sovereign]." 129 The
doctrine presumes title to the foreshore to be in the sovereign unless expressly
granted to the littoral owner. This title, however, is subject to the public's right
of use for fishing, navigation, and swimming. 130 Thus, the sovereign holds the
lands injuspublicum, in trust for the common use and benefit of the public. 13 1
The seminal case of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois3 2 established the
foundation for the modem development of the public trust doctrine in the
United States. In 1869 the Illinois legislature granted one thousand acres of
tidelands in Lake Michigan to a railroad company. The legislature later revoked
the grant, and the railroad challenged the revocation. 133 The Supreme Court
ruled that the grant was revocable because title to the shorelands was held in
trust for the people of the State. The Court noted:
The trust developing upon the State for the public, and which can only
be discharged by the management and control of property in which the
public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the prop-
erty. The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be
lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of
the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial im-
pairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. 134
The Court also articulated a "model for judicial skepticism"' 3 5 to scruti-
nize legislative attempts to terminate public trust interests through conveyances
126. Roman jurisprudence held that "[b]y the law of nature these things are common to man-
kind-the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea." THE INSTrrUTES o
JusrimN 2.1.1 (1870). The shores of the sea extended "to the limit reached by the greatest winter
flood." Id. at 2.1.3.
127. For a discussion of the English common-law theory ofjuspublicum, see Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1 (1894):
In England, from the time of Lord Hale, it has been treated as settled that the title in the
soil of the sea,... below ordinary high water mark, is in the King, except so far as an
individual or a corporation has acquired rights in it by express grant, or by prescription or
usage; and that this title,jusprivatum, whether in the King or in a subject, is held subject
to the public right, jus publicum, of navigation and fishing.
Id. at 13; see also Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821) (discussing history of public trust in England),
128. See, eg. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 13 (1821) ("[U]pon the Revolution, all of the royal
rights [in the foreshore] vested in the people of New Jersey, as the sovereign of the country ...
129. Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas. A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine,
79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970).
130. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842); see Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. Rnv. 471, 475-89
(1970); Comment, supra note 129, at 776-87. See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the expansion of the doctrine to include other public uses.
131. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-11 (1842).
132. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
133. Id. at 394-414.
134. Id. at 453. The holding does not prohibit all sales of trust lands to private parties. It only
precludes disposition of the government's authority to govern the lands.
135. Sax, supra note 130, at 491. The model "poses a set of relevant standards for current, less
dramatic instances of dubious governmental conduct." Id.
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to private individuals. 136 Finally, the Court extended the public trust doctrine
beyond its common-law limitation to ocean waters to include the land under the
navigable waters of the Great Lakes. 137
Not all jurisdictions apply the public trust doctrine to the foreshore. These
states fix the boundary of private property at the low-tide mark138 and vest title
to the foreshore in the littoral owner. 139 North Carolina, however, is a "high-
tide" state, 140 holding that private property ends at the high-tide line and that
the foreshore is the property of the state.1 4 1
North Carolina accepted the public trust doctrine in Shepard's Point Land
Co. v. Atlantic Hotel,142 in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina quoted
the decision in Illinois Central with approval. 143 Plaintiff in Shepard's Point
brought a replevin action for recovery of oceanfront property granted to him by
the State upon which defendant had erected walks, wharves, and a pavilion. 144
Defendant claimed that because the property was the foreshore, plaintiff had
never owned it and defendant, owner of the adjacent upland property, had an
easement right of a riparian owner to erect wharves, walks, and a pavilion. 14 5
The court agreed with defendant and held that any grant to plaintiff by the State
was legally ineffective to dispose of public trust property. Thus, plaintiff had no
ownership claim to the foreshore and could assert no right of title against de-
fendant. 146 Although the public trust doctrine has received rather confused
treatment in the North Carolina courts, 147 case law supports the conclusion that
a public trust easement burdens both state and privately owned trust lands.148
136. Id. Professor Sax suggests that the model would extend to less egregicus government ac-
tions that interfere with public rights in trust property, such as the building of seawalls or other
obstructions.
137. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455.
138. Such states are called "low-tide" states. The low-tide states are Connecticut, Delaware,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See 1 WATER AND WATER
RIGHTS § 36.3(C) (R. Clark ed. 1967).
139. Id; see, eg., In re Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974) (colonial ordinance
vested title to the foreshore in littoral owner).
140. See Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 302, 177
S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970). Other high-tide states are Alabama, Alaska, California, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Texas, and Washington. See 1 R. POWELL, supra note 10, 163, at 698 n.13.
For a discussion of the public trust doctrine in North Carolina, see Comment, Defining Naviga-
ble Waters and the Application of the Public Trust Doctrine in North Carolina, 49 N.C.L. REV. 888
(1971).
141. Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 302, 177
S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970). Prior to Carolina Beach there was much confusion as to whether North
Carolina was a low- or high-tide state. See Comment, supra note 140, at 892. The confusion re-
sulted from the tests for title employed by the North Carolina courts to determine the inland line of
state ownership. See Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 8-12.
142. 132 N.C. 517, 44 S.E. 39 (1903).
143. Id. at 525-28, 44 S.E. at 41-42.
144. Id. at 517-18, 44 S.E. at 39.
145. Id. at 518, 538, 44 S.E. at 39, 44.
146. Id. at 541, 44 S.E. at 47. By statute, "[n]o submerged lands may be conveyed in fee, but
easements therein may be granted." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-3(1) (1983). Submerged lands include
the foreshore. See Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 4-7.
147. See Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 8-12.
148. See id. at 17.
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B. Scope of the Public Trust Doctrine: What is a Public Trust Use?
The public trust doctrine protects certain uses from interference by private
individuals or the government. Public trust uses traditionally were defined in
terms of navigation, commerce, and fishing. 149 American courts, however, have
expanded the scope of trust uses to include swimming, sunbathing, hunting,
camping, and other shore-related recreational activities.15 0 The California
Supreme Court in Marks v. Whitney151 added ecological preservation to the list
of public trust uses, noting that the state "is not burdened with an outmoded
classification favoring one mode of utilization over another .... ,,152 Similar
reasoning was used by the New Jersey Supreme Court in holding that the public
trust doctrine dictates that public beaches be open to all without discrimination:
We have no difficulty in finding that, in this latter half of the twentieth
century, the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient
prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but extend as well to recrea-
tional uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activities.
The public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should be
molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the
public it was created to benefit. 153
The public trust doctrine developed in England at a time when fishing and com-
merce were becoming increasingly important. The New Jersey Supreme Court
and others have recognized the importance of shore-related recreational activi-
ties and the corollary need for expansion of the doctrine to include such
activities.154
Although the North Carolina courts have not explicitly expanded public
trust uses beyond navigation, bathing, and fishing, a federal court interpreting
North Carolina law has found hunting to be a proper use of public trust land. 155
149. Comment, supra note 129, at 775.
150. See, eg., Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d
47 (1972) (public rights include bathing, swimming, and other shore activities); Diana Shooting Club
v. Husting, 756 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 816 (1914) (public rights include hunting); see also Comment,
supra note 129, at 781-87 (catalogue of public rights).
151. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 375, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971). The Marks decision is discussed in
Comment, Expanding the Definition of Public Trust Uses, 51 N.C.L. REv. 316 (1972).
152. Marks, 6 Cal.3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
153. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 309, 294 A.2d 47, 54
(1972).
154. Id.; see also I WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 138, § 36.4(B), at 202:
The principle that the public has an interest in tidelands and a right to use them for pur-
poses for which there is a substantial public demand may be derived from the fact that the
public won a right to passage over the shore for access to the sea for fishing when this was
the area of substantial public demand.
155. See Swan Island Club v. White, 114 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1953), aff'd sub nom. Swan
Island Club v. Yarborough, 209 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1954). Swan Island was an action brought to
enjoin duck hunters from trespassing upon submerged waters in Currituck Sound. Id. at 97. Plain-
tiff claimed title to the lands under state land grants. Id. at 99. The court found that the lands were
impressed with a public trust, id. at 100-01, and therefore the state had no authority to grant them to
plaintiff. Id. at 100. Because plaintiff had no title, it was not necessary for the court to decide
whether defendants had an easement right to hunt on the property. Id. at 103. In dicta, however,
the court declared that "the public has the right to use navigable waters over privately owned bot-
toms for the purpose of navigation and that this right includes the right to hunt and take wild
game." Id. The court noted that North Carolina had "not decided the question of the extent of the
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Furthermore, North Carolina decisions consistently have used general language
in declaring that the foreshore "is reserved for the use of the public."' 156 In State
v. Baum'5 7 the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that the "public [has] the
right to the unobstructed navigation [of public trust lands] as a public highway
for all purposes of pleasure or profit. s158 This language suggests that the courts
would be willing to extend the scope of the doctrine to include recreational uses.
The issue simply has never been raised in North Carolina.
C. Scope of the Public Trust Doctrine: Expansion to the Dry-Sand Beach
1. Tests for Determining Public Trust Lands
As developed in England, the public trust doctrine applied only to lands
over which the tide ebbed and flowed.' 5 9 The United States Supreme Court has
modified and extended the doctrine to include other lands. In Martin v. Wad-
dell's Lessee' 6° the Court adopted the concept of "navigability" to determine
public trust lands. 16 1 Originally, this concept merely restated the ebb-and-flow
test.162 Subsequent decisions, however, rejected the ebb-and-flow test for inland,
nontidal waters and held all federal lands under navigable-in-fact waters to be
impressed with the public trust.163 Most states similarly apply the navigable-in-
fact test to determine which state lands are public trust lands.164 The North
right of the public to use the navigable waters," but stated that it "[felt] free to accept the...
reasonable and appropriate [rule] for North Carolina in the light of North Carolina decisions." Id.
In affirming the decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that
the trial court's holding that the lands "would be subject to the same trust in behalf of the public that
would affect them if title were held by the state" was "the logical application of the trust doctrine
. .. in North Carolina." Swan Island Club v. Yarborough, 209 F.2d 698, 702 (4th Cir. 1954). The
appellate court, however, stopped short of affirming the trial court's expansion in dicta regarding the
public trust doctrine.
156. Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 299, 177
S.E.2d 513, 515 (1970); see also State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 603, 609, 48 S.E. 586, 588 (1904) (Public
trust lands are "reserved for free and unrestricted use by the public.").
157. 128 N.C. 600, 38 S.E. 900 (1904).
158. Id. at 604, 38 S.E. at 901 (emphasis added).
159. See Hannig, The Public Trust Doctrine Expansion and Integration: A Proposed Balancing
Test, 23 SANTA C.ARA L. REv. 211, 224 (1983); Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 5.
160. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
161. Id. at 410.
162. Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 6.
163. rd.
164. See J. WEBmSR, supra note 29, § 350, at 369. The federal test of navigability-in-fact was
stated in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). Lands "are navigable in fact when they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water." Id. at 563. States, however, may adopt "different and less stringent tests of navigability" to
determine the extent of public use of waterways. Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park
Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 567-68, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830, 834 (1976); see also Fox River Paper Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1927) ("[The] nature and extent of the rights of the state...
in navigable waters within the state... are matters of state law to be determined by the statutes and
judicial decisions of the state."). Many states have adopted tests different from the federal standard.
Michigan, for example, uses a "log-flotation test." Bott v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 415 Mich.
45, 62, 327 N.W.2d 838, 841-42 (1982). Under that test, a waterway is navigable if it is large enough
to float logs. Id. Courts in California, Idaho, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have developed a
recreational boating test, which holds that waters "capable of being navigated by oar or motor pro-
pelled small craft" are navigable.in-fact. People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1050,
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Carolina courts have used both the ebb-and-flow test and the navigable-in-fact
test to determine public trust lands.165 Nonetheless, language used by the courts
indicates that public trust lands in North Carolina are those covered by waters
that actually are navigable for sea vessels, 16 6 or that are navigable by vessels or
boats "such as are employed in the ordinary course of water commerce, trade,
and travel." 167 For tidelands, the ebb-and-flow test still applies, granting the
state ownership to the mean high-tide line.168
2. Judicial Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine to Include
the Dry-Sand Beach
As currently applied, the public trust doctrine includes the foreshore, the
area that is "daily covered and uncovered" by the "ordinary ebb and flow of
normal tides."' 169 The question arises whether the public trust doctrine can be
extended to include the dry-sand beach that is only occasionally covered by the
tides.' 70 Attempts to expand the doctrine to include the dry-sand area were
rejected at common law171 and have been rejected by most American jurisdic-
tions. 172 A 1984 New Jersey Supreme Court decision, however, held that the
97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 454 (1971); see Hitchings, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 560, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 830 (1976)
(applying recreational boating test); Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Dicabo Livestock, Inc.,
96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974) (Idaho courts use log-flotation test and recreational boating test
to determine navigability); Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 170 Ohio St.
193, 163 N.E.2d 373 (1959) (Ohio uses recreational boating test); Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952) (Wisconsin uses recreational boating test); Day v. Armstrong,
362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961) (Wyoming uses recreational boating test). One commentator has noted
that the recreational boating test "takes advantage of the freedom of individual states to adopt prin-
ciples of navigability and jurisdiction over navigable waters that are consistent with their own needs
and desires." Frank, Forever Free" Navigability, Inland Waterways, and the Expanding Public Inter-
est, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 579, 626 & n.215 (1982).
165. See Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 11-15. In an early case, State v. Dibble, 49 N.C. (4 Jones)
107 (1856), the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the ebb-and-flow test, declaring that test to
be "entirely inapplicable to our situation." Id. at 110. Dibble, however, involved only nontidal
waters, and the holding is properly limited to those waters. See State v. Glen, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 321,
325 (1859) ("We hold, that any waters, whether sounds, bays, rivers or creeks, which are wide enough
and deep enough for the navigation of sea vessels, are navigable waters [and are] open and common
to all the citizens of the state. . . .") (emphasis added). In Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v.
Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 177 S.E.2d 513 (1970), the supreme court noted that the
North Carolina "position [on the dividing line between state and private property] is somewhat
obscured by the vagaries of ancient cases." Id. at 302, 177 S.E.2d at 516. North Carolina is not
alone in its obfuscation of the law of navigability. As one commentator has noted, "the concept is a
slippery one .... To appreciate [the] schizoid nature of the lavw... one need venture no further
than the decisions of the United States Supreme Court." Frank, supra note 164, at 582.
166. See Resort Dev. Co. v. Parmele, 235 N.C. 689, 695, 71 S.E.2d 474, 479 (1952) (citing
Collins v. Benbury, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 277,282 (1842), afr'd on reh'gper curiar, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 118
(1844)).
167. Parmele v. Eaton, 240 N.C. 539, 548, 83 S.E.2d 93, 99 (1954).
168. Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 7.
169. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1329 (5th ed. 1979).
170. Roman law included the area up to the highest storm lines. See supra note 126. This
definition probably would include the dry-sand area.
171. In Attorney Gen. v. Chambers, 4 De. G.M. & G. 206, 43 Eng. Rep. 486 (1854), Lord
Chancellor Cranworth, after carefully researching this "very obscure question," concluded that the
Crown's right to the seashore was limited to lands that "for the most part [are not] dry or mani-
orable." Id. at 218, 43 Eng. Rep. at 490.
172. The United States Supreme Court has held that the tidelands extend only so far as the land
"'between ordinary high and low-water mark, the land over which the daily tides ebb and flow."'
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public trust warranted public use of the dry-sand area "subject to an accommo-
dation of the interests of the owner." 173 In a prior decision, that court had
suggested in dicta that the public, in exercising its public trust rights, might be
entitled to infringe upon the private dry-sand beaches adjacent to the fore-
shore. 174 The case of Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association
175
presented the question directly to the court.
In Matthews defendant, a nonprofit corporation, owned and leased certain
oceanfront properties in the Borough of Bay Head for the use of its members. 1
76
Except for fishermen, who were allowed to use the dry-sand to access the fore-
shore, only Association members were allowed to use the beach between 10:00
a.m. and 5:30 p.m. during the summer. 177 Plaintiffs, residents of a neighboring
borough, joined with the public advocate178 and asserted that defendants had
denied the general public its right of access to public trust lands.
179
The court first noted the general acceptance of the public trust doctrine in
New Jersey.' 8 0 It then reviewed its prior findings of public rights in dry-sand
beach areas owned by a municipality.'18  Finally, the court addressed the extent
Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22-23 (1935) (quoting United States v.
Pacheco, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 587, 590 (1864)).
173. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 325, 471 A.2d 355, 365, cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984). A dissenting justice in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462
P.2d 671 (1969) argued that the court should have expanded the public trust doctrine to include the
dry-sand beach rather than apply custom to create a public right of access. Id., at 601-02, 462 P.2d
at 679 (Denecke, J., dissenting). By expanding the doctrine only insofar as public use is concerned,
the New Jersey court in Matthews avoided the problem encountered in Hughes v. State, 67 Wash. 2d
799, 410 P.2d 20 (1966), rev'd sub noma. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967). InHughes the
Washington Supreme Court held that the landward boundary of the wet-sand area was the vegeta-
tion line and that state ownership extended to that line. Id. at 811, 816, 410 P.2d at 27, 29. The
United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision, finding that state ownership extended
only to the mean.high-tide line. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967). Citing its decision in
Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935), the Court stated that the question of
ownership of the tidelands is a federal question. Hughes, 389 U.S. at 292-93. To avoid reversal on
federal question grounds, a court following the Matthews rationale should limit its decision to the
issue of rights and interests of the public in the dry-sand area and not assert state ownership of this
area. See also Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 7 ("Although federal law determines the extent of the
submerged lands each state acquired upon its admission to the Union, the subsequent disposition of
such lands is a matter of state law."). The Matthews rationale, however, still may be challenged as a
taking of private property in violation of the United States Constituion. See infra note 206. But see
Comment, The Public May Have a Right to Use Privately Owned Beaches For Recreation But the
Extent of Any Such Right Will Be Determined With a Location by Location Test: Matthews v. Bay
Head Improvement Ass'n, 15 RUTGERS LJ. 813, 826 (1985) (decision in Matthews was not an un-
constitutional taking).
174. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 NJ. 296, 308-09, 294 A.2d
47, 54 (1972).
175. 95 NJ. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 93 (1984). For background and discus-
sion of this case, see Comment, supra note 173.
176. Matthews, 95 NJ. at 314, 471 A.2d at 359. Membership was limited to residents of the
Borough of Bay Head. Id. at 315, 471 A.2d at 359.
177. Id. The public was allowed to use the beach from 5:30 p.m. to 10:00 am. during the sum-
mer. There were no hourly restrictions between Labor Day and mid-June. Id.
178. The public advocate is a "statutorily created ombudsman with broad powers to institute
and prosecute public interest litigation." Weigel, Opening Up Private Beach Through 'Public Trust'
Doctrine, 63 TrrLE NEWS, May 1984, at 6, 8.
179. Matthews, 95 NJ. at 312-13, 471 A.2d at 358.
180. Id. at 316-17, 471 A.2d at 360.
181. Id. at 321-22, 471 A.2d at 363. In Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-
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of the public's interest in privately owned dry-sand beaches. Two interests were
recognized by the court: (1) the right to cross the dry sand in order to gain
access to the foreshore, and (2) the right to sunbathe and use the beach for
general recreational activities.18 2 The court held that rights in the dry-sand area
under the public trust doctrine included both the right of passage and the right
of recreational use1 83 and concluded that the Association must open its beaches
to the general public.18 4
The bather's right in the upland18 5 sands is not limited to passage.
Reasonable enjoyment of the foreshore and the sea cannot be realized
unless some enjoyment of the dry sand area is also allowed. The com-
plete pleasure of swimming must be accompanied by intermittent peri-
ods of rest and relaxation beyond the water's edge. . . . The
unavailability of the physical situs for such rest and relaxation would
seriously curtail and in many situations eliminate the right to the rec-
reational use of the ocean. 18 6
The court limited its holding to those beaches where circumstances reasonably
necessitate use of the dry-sand area for enjoyment of the ocean.187 Perhaps the
Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a municipally owned
dry-sand beach dedicated to the public must be open to all members of the public. Id. at 309, 294
A.2d at 54. The court said that the public trust doctrine "dictates that the beach and the ocean
waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference and that any contrary state or
municipal action is impermissible." Id. Thus, the Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea could not prohibit
use of the beach by nonresidents.
In Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 393 A.2d 571 (1978), the supreme court held that
the public's right to use municipally owned beaches was not dependent upon dedication for use by
the general public. Id. at 179-80, 393 A.2d at 573. The Borough of Deal, perhaps in light of the
Neptune City decision, had dedicated the beach for use by its residents only. Id. at 176, 393 A.2d at
572. Such limited dedication, the court said, was "immaterial" because the public trust requires that
the public be given a right to use all dry-sand beaches owned by a municipality. Id. at 179-80, 393
A.2d at 573.
182. Matthews, 95 N.J. at 323, 471 A.2d at 364.
183. Id. at 325, 471 A.2d at 365.
184. Id. at 331-32, 471 A.2d at 368-69. Two factors were of particular importance to the court.
First, the court found that "[w]hen viewed in its totality-its purposes, relationship with the munici-
pality, communal characteristics, activities, and virtual monopoly over the Bay Head beachfront-
the quasi-public nature of the Association is apparent." Id. at 330, 471 A.2d at 368. Second, the
court noted that there was no public beach in the Borough of Bay Head. "If the residents of every
municipality bordering the Jersey shore were to adopt the Bay Head policy, the public would be
prevented from exercising its right to enjoy the foreshore. The Bay Head Residents may not frus-
trate the public's right [under the public trust doctrine] in this manner." Id. at 331, 471 A.2d at 368.
Although concluding that the public's rights in private beaches "are not co-extensive with the rights
enjoyed in municipal beaches," the court stated that "private landowners may not in all instances
prevent the public from exercising its rights under the public trust doctrine." Matthews, 95 N.J. at
326, 471 A.2d at 366.
185. The court used the term "upland" to refer to the dry-sand area, not property landward of
the vegetation line.
186. Matthews, 95 N.J. at 316, 471 A.2d at 365.
187. Id. According to the court, circumstances to be considered included location of the "dry
sand area in relation to the foreshore, extent and availability of publicly-owned upland sand area,
nature and extent of the public demand, and usage of the upland sand land by the owner." Id. The
court emphasized that the public's right of access under the public trust doctrine "does not mean the
public has an unrestricted right to cross at will over any and all property bordering on the common
property. The public interest is satisfied so long as there is reasonable access to the sea." Id. at 324,
471 A.2d at 364.
Although the public advocate in Matthews urged that all privately owned beachfront property
be opened to the public, the court found that "[n]othing has been developed on this record to justify
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most significant aspect of the Matthews decision was the court's rejection of pre-
scription, dedication, and custom as alternatives to the public trust doctrine.18 8
"Archaic judicial responses," the court said, "are not an answer to a modem
social problem. Rather, we perceive the public trust doctrine not to be 'fixed or
static,' but one to 'be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and
needs of the public it was created to benefit.' -189
The court in Matthews established the public trust doctrine as the only legal
concept with sufficient "breadth and substantive content" to make it a useful
tool for beach access. 190 The underlying principle-that the unique nature of
tidelands imposes upon them a public trust-is easily applicable to beaches; in-
deed, court decisions relying on dedication, custom, and prescription have as-
sumed public recreational use to be inherent in beach land. 191
The Matthews decision illustrates that the public trust doctrine can embrace
the dry-sand areas adjacent to the foreshore, even though these areas are not
within the traditionally defined scope of the public trust doctrine. Furthermore,
the decision exemplifies an active judicial role in interpreting public policy with
respect to the beaches. Professor Sax notes that the "fundamental function of
courts in the public trust area is one of democratization."' 192 In this function,
the courts promote "equality of political power for a disorganized and diffuse
majority," 193 the public. The judiciary, however, has been "both misunderstood
and underrated as a resource for dealing with [natural] resources." 194 The
North Carolina courts have shown insight and sensitivity to many of the
problems of resource management, particularly in the coastal area. 195 For these
[the position of the public advocate]." Id. at 333, 471 A.2d at 369. "All we decide here," the court
said, "is that private land is not immune from a possible right of access to the foreshore. . . or [use
of the dry-sand area] by the public incidental to the right of bathing and swimming." Id. at 333-34,
471 A.2d at 369. Because court decisions are subject to a challenge on the grounds that they effect a
taking of private property in violation of the fifth amendment, see infra note 206 and accompanying
text, the court in Matthews carefully limited its decision to the beach area at issue, finding that the
public interests outweighed the private interests. See Matthews, 95 NJ. at 324, 471 A.2d at 365
("[P]articular circumstances must be considered and examined before arriving at a solution that will
accommodate the public's right and the private interests involved.").
188. Matthews, 95 N.J. at 325-26, 471 A.2d at 365.
189. Id. (quoting Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 309,
294 A.2d 47, 54 (1972)).
190. Sax, supra note 130, at 474.
191. See ag., State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 588, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (1969) (dry-
sand area "could not be used conveniently. . . for any other purpose" other than recreational use).
192. Sax, supra note 130, at 561.
193. Id. at 560. But see Bott v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 415 Mich. 45, 86, 327 N.W.2d 838,
853 (1982) (The courts are "not an appropriate forum for resolving the competing societal values
which underlie this controversy [over public trust lands]" and thus a "comprehensive legislative
solution" is needed.).
194. Sax, supra note 130, at 560. A dissenting justice in City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama,
Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974), made the same point:
What is overlooked by the majority is that as to prescriptive public coastal areas,
navigable waters, tide lands and sovereignty lands, the judiciary has a positive and solemn
duty as a last resort to protect the public's rights to the enjoyment and use of any of such
lands. There is ample precedent of this Court to afford this protection, including those
relating to the inalienable trust doctrine in sovereignty lands and navigable areas.
Id. at 81 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
195. See, eg., Adams v. Department of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 693, 249
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reasons, the public trust doctrine as applied by the New Jersey court in Mat-
thews is the most useful judicial tool for developing a North Carolina open beach
policy.
Recent North Carolina legislation and a recent report by the Legislative
Research Commission 196 (the "Commission") support the conclusion that the
public trust doctrine is a viable tool for establishing an open beach policy in
North Carolina. The Commission found that North Carolina "has been one of
the leading states in the protection of submerged lands" 197 and generally has
prohibited the granting of navigable beds.. . in a way that would restrict the
use of the waters for commerce, for fishing and for other pleasure activities." 198
The report recommended that the North Carolina General Assembly enact leg-
islation to provide for the management and protection of the public trust re-
sources held by the state. 199 In response, the general assembly passed two acts
that clarify existing public trust rights. The first act states that property subject
to public trust rights may not be acquired by adverse possession.200 Public trust
rights, as defined by the act, "are established by common law as interpreted by
the courts of this State," 201 and "include public access to the beaches. ' 20 2 The
second act states that beach land "raised above the mean high water mark by
publicly financed projects vests in the State. '203 Furthermore, these lands are
subject to the public trust and "shall remain open to the free use and enjoyment
of the people of the State."' 2°4 Although public beach access is included in the
definition of public rights, it is doubtful that expansion of the public trust doc-
trine to include the dry-sand area will be accomplished by this or any legislation;
indeed, other than the brief reference in the definition of public rights, public
beach access is not mentioned as a priority.
3. Constitutional Considerations in Judicial Expansion
of the Public Trust Doctrine
Judicial expansion of the public trust doctrine may be challenged as a tak-
ing205 of private property for public benefit without just compensation in viola-
S.E.2d 402, 408 (1978) (The "special and urgent environmental problems found in the coastal zone
. ..warrant special... attention.").
196. LEGisLA'nVE RESEARCH COMM'N, COASTAL SUBMERGED LANDS, REPORT TO THE 1985
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA (1985).
197. Id. at 8.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 15-16.
200. Act of May 30, 1985, ch. 277, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 7 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
45 (1983)) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1).
201. Id. The language "as interpreted by the courts of this State" suggests that although the
general assembly recognizes existing public trust rights, it leaves the delineation of the scope of those
rights to the courts.
202. Id.
203. Act of May 30, 1985, ch. 276, § 1(2), 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 6 (amending N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 146-6 (1983)) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 146-(6)(f)).
204. Id.
205. A taking "is constitutional law's expression for any sort of publicly inflicted private injury
for which the constitution requires payment of compensation." Michelman, Property Utility and
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tion of the United States Constitution. 20 6 Although the original taking concept
may "have contemplated only actual physical appropriation, 20 7 Supreme Court
decisions have made clear that a taking also may occur when the government
interferes with the rights of private property ownership.20° Expansion of the
public trust doctrine to include the dry-sand beach may not deprive private own-
ers of all use of their property, but it may deprive them of rights incidental to
that property.
A court's declaration that the public trust doctrine protects public use of a
dry-sand beach may be an unconstitutional taking because it effects a change in
existing property law.2°9 Although the North Carolina courts never have ad-
Fairness Comments on the Ethical Foundation of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARe. L. Rnv.
1165, 1165 (1967).
206. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No person shall.. be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." This provision is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Chicago B. & Q.RL.L v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
An uncompensated taking is also a violation of the North Carolina Constitution: "No person
shall... be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land." N.C. CONST. art.
I, § 19. The "law of the land" has been interpreted to include the principle that there can be no
taking of private property without just compensation. DeBruhl v. State Highway and Public Works
Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958).
207. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsrrrUTXoNAL LAW 483 (1983). Such physical
appropriation, however, might be a proper exercise of the state's eminent domain power if compen-
sation is made and the acquisition is for public use. Id. at 495. The fifth amendment's "limitation on
taking private property is a tacit recognition that the power to take private property exists." Id. at
481. Every state constitution, except that of North Carolina, limits exercise of the eminent domain
power. 1 NICHOLS ON EM'ENT DOMAiN § 1.3, at 79 (J. Sackman rev. 3d ed. 1973).
208. See, eg., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (interference with landowner's
right to exclude others held to be an unconstitutional taking); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946) (frequent flights of government planes over plaintiffs' land interfered with use of air space and
constituted a taking); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (invalidating Pennsylvania
law prohibiting coal mining).
209. See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967) (The law that land gained through accre-
tion belongs to the owner of adjoining land was not "open to question" and thus a declaration by the
State of Washington that it owned accreted land was an unconstitutional taking.). A concurringjustice in Hughes was more direct:
There can be little doubt about the impact of that change [in property law] upon Mrs.
Hughes. The beach she had every reason to regard as hers was declared by the state court
to be in the public domain.... Although the state in this case made no attempt to take
the accreted lands by eminent domain, it achieved the same result by effecting a retroactive
transformation of private into public property-without paying for the privilege of doing
SO.
Id. at 298 (Stewart, I., concurring). The change in property law attempted by the State of Washing-
ton in Hughes affected ownership of the dry-sand beach. This Comment does not recommend that
North Carolina courts assert state ownership of private dry-sand beaches. See supra note 173.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has held that a public right of passage along the foreshore
beaches is not a right recognized by the original colonial ordinance and therefore a bill proposing to
create such a right was unconstitutional. In re Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566-67
(Mass. 1974). The colonial ordinance extended littoral ownership to the mean low-tide line, id. at
565, making Massachusetts one of the few states granting such ownership. See supra note 138 and
accompanying text. Proponents of the bill argued that the legislation was "merely an exercise of
existing public rights" and not a change in property law. Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 566.
The proponents also argued that although the original ordinance authorized public navigational and
fishing uses of the foreshore, public uses had changed, and the ordinance "now must be deemed to
include the important public interest in recreation." Id. at 567. The court disagreed, stating that
"the grant to private parties effected by the colonial ordinance has never been interpreted to provide
the littoral owners only such uncertain and ephemeral rights as would result from such an interpre-
tation." Id. Because the public trust rights were specified in the Massachusetts ordinance, the
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dressed directly the scope of public trust rights,2 10 the supreme court has stated
that the foreshore is public trust land and is therefore "reserved for the use of
the public. '2 11 Most of the North Carolina decisions, however, have involved
the extent of private ownership or littoral rights under the public trust doctrine
and not the extent of public rights.2 12 Thus, though the law may be settled on
the issue of ownership, it is not settled on the issue of the extent and availability
of public trust rights.213
The fundamental constitutional problem presented by the public trust doc-
trine is not that it works a change in existing property law, but that it deprives
the owner of property rights incidental to ownership. In determining whether a
taking has occurred, the courts have developed two tests. 2 14 The first is a literal
taking test, which is applied when there is an actual physical appropriation of
private property.215 Under this test, such an appropriation is a taking per se,
court's decision was an interpretation of statutory rights rather than common-law rights. There is
no similar language in North Carolina statutes or in the North Carolina Constitution. At least one
commentator, however, suggests that extensions of common-law doctrines to provide public access
to beaches are unconstitutional takings. See Note, Assault on the Beaches: "Taking" Public Recrea-
tional Rights to Private Property, 60 B.U.L. Rnv. 933 (1980); see also Van Ness v. Borough of Deal,
78 N.J. 174, 185-89, 393 A.2d 571, 577-78 (1978) (Mountain, J., dissenting) (majority's holding that
public trust doctrine requires all municipal beaches to be opened to general public was an unconsti-
tutional taking).
210. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
211. Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 299, 177
S.E.2d 513, 515 (1970).
212. See, eg., id. (when eroded beach was filled in and raised back above sea-level by town, title
vested in town; plaintiff's title was lost when the property eroded and became part of foreshore);
Capune v. Robbins, 273 N.C. 581, 160 S.E.2d 881 (1968) (littoral owner has right to construct pier
to provide passage to sea, but passage under pier must be unobstructed over width of foreshore);
McKenzie's Ex'rs v. Hulet, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 613 (1817) (littoral rights do not include title to
foreshore).
213. The dissenting justice in Bott v. Natural Resources Comm'n., 415 Mich. 45, 327 N.W.2d
838 (1982) stated that the Michigan law regarding public navigational rights under the public trust
doctrine was not "'well-settled' "because "no conflict has existed in prior determinations concern-
ing the navigability or permissible public uses of our inland lakes and streams." Id. at 127, 327
N.W.2d at 872 (Moody, J., dissenting). It also has been suggested that the public trust is not so well-
defined that other public rights could not be established under it. See 1 WATER & WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 138, § 36.4(B), at 202 (Limiting the public trust doctrine by suggesting that all public
rights are already defined "confuses the application of the principle under given circumstances with
the principle itself.").
214. One of the tests was developed by Justice Harlan, the other by Justice Holmes. J. NoWAx,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 207, at 483. Justice Harlan believed a taking occurred only
when the government actually appropriated land. Id. Justice Holmes, however, took a broader view
and found a taking whenever government regulation significantly restricted a landowner's use of
property. Id. at 484. The Court "much to the consternation of commentators has retained to some
extent both the theories of Holmes and Harlan" and has not developed a "single framework to define
a taking." Id. at 485. Professor Sax has commented that "the [Supreme] Court has settled upon no
satisfactory rationale for the.cases and operates somewhat haphazardly, using any or all of the avail-
able, often conflicting, theories without developing any clear approach to the constitutional prob-
lem." Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. 36, 46 (1964). Similarly, Justice Brennan
has noted that taking cases are "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
215. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), the Supreme Court applied the literal taking test
and held that a statute prohibiting the manufacture of liquor was not a taking of a beer manufac-
turer's property. Such a prohibition, the Court declared, was not "in any just sense,... an appro-
priation of property for the public benefit." Id. at 668-69. Although never overruled, the language
in Mugler has been "judiciously ignored... in cases where non-acquisitive governmental action has
been found to be a taking." J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 207, at 484.
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and compensation must be given. 216 The second test is a regulatory taking test,
which is applied when there is not a literal appropriation but an interference
with a property owner's use of property.2 17 Under this test, a court will balance
the benefits to the public with the harm to the property owner to determine
whether a taking has occurred.21 8 Although it is not always clear which of these
two tests a court will apply, a recent United States Supreme Court opinion at-
tempted to clarify the general taking principles and to distinguish the use of the
two tests.
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,219 the Supreme Court
held that a New York statute requiring landlords to permit installation of cable
television equipment on their property was a taking of private property for
which the landlords were owed compensation. 220 In its holding the Court dis-
tinguished between a permanent physical occupation and a temporary physical
invasion; 221 the former is a per se taking under the literal taking test,222 and the
latter is subject to the balancing process under the regulatory test.223
The Court in Loretto did not give a concise definition of a permanent physi-
cal occupation,2 24 but cases cited by it suggest that in at least two situations a
taking will always be found. The first is when private property is actually in-
vaded by water, earth, sand, other materials, or artificial structures.22 5 The sec-
ond is when the government takes possession and control of all or part of private
property without compensation. 226 The facts in Loretto involved the first situa-
216. See Michelman, supra note 205, at 1184; see also Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166, 181 (1871) ("[Wlhere real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water,
earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually
destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking ....").
217. This view was developed by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922). In Pennsylvania Coal a state statute prohibiting coal mining was held to be a taking
without compensation.
218. See infra notes 238-51 and accompanying text.
219. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). For discussions of the case, see Note, Access for CATV Meets the
Taking Clause: The Per Se Takings Rule of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 25
ARIZ. L. REv. 689 (1983); Note, Loretto v. Teleprompter: A Restatement of the Per Se Physical
Invasion Test for Takings, 35 BAYLOR L. REv. 373 (1983).
220. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438. The cable was installed on appellant's roof and was less than one-
half inch in diameter and approximately 35 feet in length. Id. at 422. Directional taps, measuring
four inches by four inches also were installed on the front and rear of the roof. Id. Finally, two large
silver boxes were installed along the roof cables. Id. Because the "installation involved a direct
physical attachment of plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to the building, completely occupying
space immediately above and upon the roof and . . . exterior wall" it was a taking "under the
traditional test." Id. at 438. Presumably, the traditional test is the literal taking test.
221. Id. at 428-35.
222. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 238-51 and accompanying text.
224. In a footnote, however, the Court cited Professor Michelman's summary of physical inva-
sion case law: "'The one incontestable case for compensation (short of formal expropriation) seems
to occur when the government deliberately brings it about that its agents, or the public at large,
"regularly" use, or "permanently" occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be
under private ownership."' Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427 n.5 (quoting Michelman, supra note 205, at
1184).
225. See id. at 427-30 (citing Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 U.S. 540 (1904);
St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166 (1871)).
226. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 431 (citing United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951)).
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tion: installation of the cable equipment was "a direct physical attachment of
plates, boxes, wires, bolts, and screws to the ... roof and ... exterior wall" of
appellant's building.227 A third situation constituting a per se taking may arise
when a government regulation is "an intrusion 'so immediate and direct as to
subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his ex-
ploitation of it.' "228 In such cases, however, a per se taking likely will be in-
ferred only when the intrusion is tantamount to actual appropriation.229 When
the intrusion is less than an actual appropriation, a court will apply the regula-
tory balancing test.230
The Loretto Court stated that its holding was "very narrow" and empha-
sized that it was merely affirming "the traditional rule that a permanent physical
occupation of property is a taking."231 Thus, it considered the distinction be-
tween a permanent physical occupation and a temporary physical invasion to
have been drawn by earlier cases; its decision merely clarified and applied the
established law.232 The Court also suggested that determining whether a perma-
nent physical occupation has occurred would not be difficult, noting that "[the
placement of a fixed structure on land or real property is an obvious fact that
will rarely be subject to dispute. '233
Does the granting of public access rights in the dry-sand beach result in a
permanent physical occupation or a temporary physical invasion? Arguably, an
227. Id. at 438.
228. Id. at 431 (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
229. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). The taking in Causby involved frequent
flights of government planes over plaintiffs' chicken farm. The disruption caused by the planes re-
sulted in plaintiffs' loss of their chicken business. The Court compared this disruption to actual
appropriation and stated that if plaintiffs "could not use [their] land for any purpose, their loss
would be... as complete as if the United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken
exclusive possession of it." Id. at 261.
The rationale in Causby had been developed in a line of cases beginning with Peabody v. United
States, 231 U.S. 530 (1913). In Peabody the Court stated in dictum that if the government acted
"with the purpose and effect of subordinating [petitioners' land] to the [rights] of the Government
...with the result of depriving the owner of [the land's] profitable use" the government action
would be a taking. Id. at 538. The intent of the government to impose a servitude on private prop-
erty could be inferred from the government action; no actual intent would be necessary. See Ports-
mouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1922) (evidence of
government's firings of guns from a gun battery could be sufficient to infer intent).
230. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432; see also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980) (Court used balancing test in upholding state law requiring shopping center owners to permit
exercise of individual free speech and petition rights); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979) (Court applied balancing test and held imposition of navigational servitude requiring public
access to a pond to be a taking).
231. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441; see also Stillings v. Winston-Salem, 311 N.C. 689, 697, 319 S.E.2d
233, 239 (1984) (court noted that Loretto restates factors to be considered in determining the exist-
ence of a taking).
232. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426-35. The court noted that the rule that a permanent occupation is a
taking "has more than tradition to commend it." Id. at 435. An occupation, the Court said, is
"perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's property interests [because] the govern-
ment does not simply take a single 'strand' from the 'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the
bundle, taking a slice of every strand." Id. (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).
233. Id. at 437. Justice Blackmun argued in dissent that the "strained and untenable distinc-
tion," id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), between permanent physical occupations and temporary
physical invasions was "less substantial than the distinction between physical and nonphysical intru-
sions that the Court already has rejected." Id. at 448 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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easement allowing for public access and recreational use is an occupation be-
cause it contemplates the continuous use of private property. Under the reason-
ing in Loretto and the cases cited therein for support, however, such an easement
is not an occupation but a temporary invasion. First, the easement does not
require the intrusion of water, or other materials, or artificial structures.234 Sec-
ond, it does not require that the government take actual possession of all or part
of the private property. 235 Third, it does not contemplate an intrusion that is
tantamount to actual appropriation.236 Last, dicta in Loretto and the Court's
approval of previous cases applying a balancing test suggest that a recreational
easement in the dry-sand beach would not be a permanent physical
occupation. 2
37
If expansion of the public trust doctrine to include the dry-sand beach is a
temporary physical invasion, it will be scrutinized under the regulatory balanc-
ing test.238 In applying this test, the North Carolina Supreme Court has bal-
anced "the diminution in value of an individual's property and the
corresponding gain to the public. '2 39 In upholding an ordinance regulating the
appearance of junkyards, the court in State v. Jones240 noted that gain to the
public can be measured by the "corollary benefits to the general community," as
well as by the protection afforded the public's health, safety and morals.241 Ben-
efits, according to the court, include "protection of property values, promotion
of tourism, indirect protection of health and safety, preservation of the character
and integrity of the community, and promotion of the comfort, happiness, and
emotional stability of area residents." 242 Expansion of the public trust doctrine
to include the dry-sand beach provides many benefits to the public, including
promotion of tourism and promotion of the comfort, happiness and emotional
234. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text. This is particularly true in North Carolina
for two reasons. First, an upland owner has no right under North Carolina law to develop the dry-
sand beach. Regulations under the Coastal Area Management Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-100
to -134.3 (1983), prohibit development on the beach area between the mean low tide line and the
recession line (last line of significant erosion), a line that is always landward of the vegetation line.
See N.C. Coastal Resoures Comm'n Reg., 15 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 7H.0304 (1985). Second, because
most North Carolina beaches historically have been open to and used by the public, see supra note
20, a judicial determination that these areas must be open to the public would not significantly
change current use.
237. See, ag., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433 (citing with approval Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164 (1979)). In KaiserAetna the Court applied the regulatory balancing test to an imposition of
a navigational servitude for public access to a pond. The Court inLoretto stated that "[a]lthough the
easement ofpassag, not being a permanent occupation of land, was not considered a taking per se,
Kaiser Aetna reemphasizes that a physical invasion is a government intrusion of an unusually serious
character." Id. at 433 (emphasis added). For an example of similar dictum, see supra text accompa-
nying note 233.
238. See supra note 217 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 218.
239. A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207,218, 258 S.E.2d 444, 451 (1979) (citing Sax,
supra note 214); accord State v. Jones, 305 N.C. 520, 526, 290 S.E.2d 675, 679 (1982).
240. 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982). The court upheld the ordinance under both the
North Carolina Constitution and the United States Constitution. Id. at 531, 290 S.E.2d at 681-82.
241. Id. at 530, 290 S.E.2d at 681.
242. Id. (citing Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation Under the Police Power: The New General Welfare
and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. L. Rnv. 603 (1981)).
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stability of area residents.24 3 More importantly, expansion of the public trust
doctrine preserves a public recreational use that is vital to the welfare of
society. 2 4
The countervailing interest, diminution in value of private property, is more
difficult to assess.24 5 One factor to be considered in determining the diminution
in value of private property is whether "the regulation results in confiscation of
the most substantial part of the value of the property or deprives the property
owner of the property's reasonable use." 246 In the land use regulation context,
this determination often has turned on the landowner's reasonable investment-
backed expectations for the use of the property.24 7 When a public right of ac-
cess is impressed on the dry-sand beach, the issue is whether an oceanfront
property owner has a reasonable expectation of the right to exclude others from
the beach. The United States Supreme Court in Kaiser Aetna v. United States
248
concluded that the right to exclude "so universally held to be a fundamental
element of the property right, falls within [the] category of interests the Govern-
ment cannot take without compensation." 24 9 The "value" of the right to ex-
243. These are, of course, the public benefits. Property owners will argue that beach access
legislation reduces property values and destroys the character and integrity of the community. One
commentator has stated that allowing public access to the beaches is the "tragedy of the beach,"
because the beachgoer, no longer fearful of being ousted, "can be noisy, have a good time and deposit
more litter than he takes away." Roberts, supra note 21, at 179. The court in Lusardi v. Curtis
Point Property Owners Ass'n, 86 N.J. 217, 430 A.2d 881 (1981) expressed another view:
Solitary walks along the shore and tranquil evenings spent among friends on the beach
comprise a dream many of us share. But this dream may not be fulfilled by excluding
others who ask for only the simpler pleasure of engaging in ocean bathing and beach activi-
ties ... . The ocean water along our coastline belongs to all... citizens ....
Id. at 230-31, 430 A.2d at 888.
244. "[H]ealth, recreation, and sports are encompassed in and intimately related to the general
welfare ofa well-balanced state." Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n., 95 N.J. 306, 321,471
A.2d 355, 363 (1984) (quoting New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super.
457,488, 292 A.2d 580, 598 (Law Div. 1971), aff'd, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545 (1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 989 (1973)).
245. In determining the diminution in value of private property, the courts examine the extent of
the interference with rights in the entire fee, not just the particular part of the fee directly impacted.
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978) (" 'Takdng' jurisprudence
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated .... [It] focuses rather... [on] the parcel as a
whole. .. ").
246. State v. Jones, 305 N.C. 520, 530, 290 S.E.2d 675, 679 (1982).
247. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("The economic
impact of the regulation on the [landowner] and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are.., relevant considerations."). Protec-
tion of a landowner's reasonable expectations is a fundamental property law concept. See
Michelman, supra note 205, at 1211-13.
248. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
249. Id. at 179-80. The controversy in KaiserAetna centered on the dredging of a 523-acre pond
in a residential community in Hawaii. Construction of a marina on the pond involved connecting
the pond to navigable waters in Maunalua Bay. Following construction, the Army Corps of Engi-
neers declared the pond to be navigable water and demanded that the public be granted a right of
access. The Supreme Court held this declaration to be a taking without just compensation. Justice
Blackmun, in a strong dissent, concluded after balancing the public benefits and private harm that
no taking had occurred. Id. at 187-91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), a privately owned shopping
center was denied the right to exclude pamphleteers from its central courtyard. The Court did not
find that a taking had occurred. This case, however, can be distinguished from Kaiser Aetna because
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clude is properly measured by the extent of public interference with the
landowner's recreational use of the beach, the extent of injury to enjoyment of
the landowner's upland property,25 0 and the investment value of exclusivity.25 1
In North Carolina, a landowner's investment-backed expectation of the
right to exclude the public from the dry-sand beach is minimal. Traditional use
of this area for recreation and passage to the foreshore 52 will make it difficult
for a landowner to establish that privacy on the dry-sand beach was a substantial
part of the investment in oceanfront property.25 3 Furthermore, because the dry-
sand beach in North Carolina may not be developed, 25 4 a landowner cannot
argue that the value of development rights in that area will be impaired by pub-
lic use.255 Thus, expansion of the public trust doctrine to include the dry-sand
beach should survive a taking challenge when the beach property at issue is in an
area of traditional public use.
IV. BEACH ACCESS LEGISLATION
At least six jurisdictions have enacted legislation designed to secure a public
right of beach access. Beach access legislation seeks to prohibit interference
with the public's right to have access to and use of the beaches. The shoreline
the shopping center was normally open to the public. Therefore, the right to exclude persons could
not be shown to be "so essential to the use or economic value of [the shopping center's] property that
the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a taking." Id. at 84. This refinement of the right to
exclude makes it more difficult for the landowner to show a taking.
250. For example, noisy beach parties could interfere with a landowner's enjoyment of upland
property.
251. For example, rental and property values could fall if a beach area becomes too crowded.
Crowded beaches, however, may indicate high demand, which in turn raises rental and property
values.
When a court requires public access over upland property, diminution in value includes not
only the value of the right to exclude, but also the value of the right to develop property to its full
potential.
252. See supra note 20.
253. The Supreme Court in Kaiser Aetna noted that petitioners had invested millions of dollars
to improve the pond on the assumption that it would be private. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180. If
the pond were opened to the public the value of lots within the development would decrease substan-
tially and annual fees would be lost. Id. Thus, the investment-backed expectations of petitioners
were significant.
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), however, the Court found that a
state law preventing the exclusion of pamphleteers from petitioners' property did not interfere with
the shopping center's value or continuing commercial functions. Id. at 83. Constitutionally permit-
ted "time, place, and manner regulations" ensured that the expressive activities did not interfere
with normal business activities. Id. See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 136 (1978) (petitioners would not only continue to gain profits but also would receive a "reason-
able return" on their investment).
254. See supra note 236.
255. In Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the Supreme Court
stated that the landowners' submission that a taking may be established "simply by showing that
[the landowners have] been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that [they] heretofore had
believed was available for development is quite simply untenable." Id. at 130. It is conceivable that
the value of upland development rights could be impaired by public use of the dry-sand area. In
areas of traditional public use of the beach, however, any diminution in value of upland property
would be outweighed by the corresponding gain to the public. Furthermore "not every destruction
or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a 'taking' in the constitutional
sense." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).
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affected by the legislation includes the stretch of dry-sand beach inland to the
vegetation line;256 statutes in Texas and the Virgin Islands specify that dredging
and filling will not alter the line.
25 7
A. Legal Basis of Beach Access Legislation
Proponents of beach access legislation assert that states can properly regu-
late land use.258 Although state land use regulations can be enacted to protect
state interests,25 9 the regulations are subject to state and federal constitutional
limitations.26° The constitutional issues raised by beach access legislation are
discussed below.
1. Is Beach Access Legislation Unconstitutional Local Legislation?
State beach access legislation in North Carolina is subject to the challenge
that it is "local legislation" in violation of the North Carolina Constitution.
2 61
The North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA)262 was challenged
as local legislation2 63 in Adams v. Department of Natural & Economic Re-
256. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53035-53036, 54091-54093 (West 1983); CAL. PuB. RES. CODE
§§ 30210-30224 (West 1977 & Supp. 1935); GUAM GOV'T CODE § 13453 (Supp. 1974); HAwAn
REV. STAT. § 115-5 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 390.605(2) (1977); TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN.
§ 61.012 (Vernon 1978); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 402(b) (1982).
257. TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 61.017(a) (Vernon 1977); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 402(b)
(1982).
258. These commentators note that due process does not prohibit a state from instituting zoning
restrictions or redefining property rights. See Comment, Coastline Crisis, 2 PAc. L.J. 226, 236
(1971); Comment, supra note 81, at 814; Comment, Easements Judicial & Legislative Protection of
the Public's Rights in Florida's Beaches, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 586, 592-93 (1973); see also Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1945) ("Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion.").
259. For a general discussion of state involvement in land use decisions, see R. HEALY & J.
ROSENBERG, LAND UsE AND THE STATES (2d ed. 1979); R. LiNowEs & 0. ALDENSWORTH, THE
STATES AND LAND USE CONTROL (1975).
260. See generally D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L. MCBENNETr & B. VESTAL, CONsTrTu-
TrONAL Issuas OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT (1977) (discussion of constitutional implications of
land use planning).
261. "The General Assembly shall not enact any local, .. or special act or resolution .... (c)
[a]uthorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining, or discontinuing of highways, streets or
alleys ... ." N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 24. The General Assembly may, however, enact laws to regu-
late these areas. N.C. CONsT. art. H, § 24(4).
The term "highway" is the generic name for all kinds of public ways including carriageways,
bridleways, and footways. Parsons v. Wright, 223 N.C. 520, 521, 27 S.E.2d 534, 536 (1943). The
term "street" includes all public ways in a city, town, or village. Id. Beach accessways fall under the
North Carolina prohibition against local legislation because they are footways.
For a discussion of the history of the constitutional provision prohibiting local legislation and
its interpretation in the North Carolina courts, see Ferrell, Local Legislation in the North Carolina
General Assembly, 45 N.C.L. REV. 340 (1967).
262. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-100 to -134.3 (1983). For a general history and analysis of
CAMA, see Glenn, The Coastal Area Management Act in the Courts: A Preliminary Analysis, 53
N.C.L. REV. 303 (1974); Heath, A Legislative History of the Coastal Area Management Act, 53
N.C.L. REv. 345 (1974); Schoenbaum, The Management of Land and Water Use in the Coastal
Zone: A New Law is Enacted in North Carolina, 53 N.C.L. REv. 272 (1974); Schoenbaum & Rosen-
berg, The Legal Implementation of Coastal Zone Management.- The North Carolina Model, 1976
DuKE LJ. 1.
263. See Glenn, supra note 262, at 306-14 for an analysis of CAMA under the local legislation
limitation.
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sources.26 4 The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the application of
CAMA to a localized area was "reasonably related to [the] purpose ' 265 of treat-
ing "the special and urgent problems" of the coastal area, and therefore the Act
was not unconstitutional local legislation.
2 66
Legislation that affects only one area of the state is not prohibited as local
legislation if it "defines a class which reasonably warrants special legislative at-
tention"267 and which is neither underinclusive nor overinclusive. 2 68 In Adams
the supreme court found that the "irreplaceable nature of the coastal zone and
its significance to the public welfare" justified special legislative treatment, and
that the coastal counties constituted a valid legislative class.
2 6 9
Beach access legislation, if drafted within the Adams guidelines, should sur-
vive a local legislation challenge. The North Carolina Supreme (Court has held
with respect to streets and highways that legislation is not a local act unless it
authorizes the "laying out, opening, altering, or discontinuing of a given particu-
lar and designated highway, street or alley." 270 Thus, beach access legislation
establishing public rights in upland areas should leave particular location of ac-
cessways to the discretion of local governments. Legislation that establishes
public rights in the dry-sand beach, however, may be attacked as invalid local
legislation because it applies to a given, particular, and designated area. The
court's decision in Adams suggests that this attack will fail.27 1
2. Is Beach Access Legislation an Unconstitutional Delegation of Authority
to an Administrative Agency?
Petitioner in Adams charged that the General Assembly had unconstitu-
tionally delegated authority to the Coastal Resources Commission (the CRC) to
promulgate rules and regulations under CAMA. 272 The general rule, applied in
Adams, is that legislative delegation of limited adjudicative and rule-making
264. 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).
265. Id. at 696, 249 S.E.2d at 410.
266. Id. at 693, 249 S.E.2d at 408.
267. Id. at 690-91, 249 S.E.2d at 407.
268. Id. at 690, 249 S.E.2d at 407. The legislation also must be uniformly applied. Id. at 692,
249 S.E.2d at 410.
269. Id. at 693, 249 S.E.2d at 408.
270. Deese v. Town of Lumberton, 211 N.C. 31, 34, 188 S.E. 857, 858 (1936) (emphasis added);
accord State v. McBane, 276 N.C. 60, 67, 170 S.E.2d 913, 918 (1969); In re Assessments, 243 N.C.
494, 498, 91 S.E.2d 171, 173-74 (1956).
271. It is unclear what constitutes a given, particular, and designated highway, street or alley.
Under an Adams analysis, designation of the dry-sand area as a public accessway is "reasonably
related to the purpose" of providing beach access. Adams, 295 N.C. at 691, 249 S.E.2d at 407. See
supra text accompanying notes 265-266.
272. Adams, 295 N.C. at 689, 249 S.E.2d at 404. The CRC is the body charged with administer-
hag CAMA. It sets guidelines for local land use plans and has review and approval authority over
them. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-107 (1983).
The North Carolina Constitution provides that the "legislative, executive, and supreme judicial
powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other." N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 6. The North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted this requirement to mean
that the general assembly "may not abdicate its power to make laws or delegate its supreme legisla-
tive power to any other coordinate branch or to any agency which it may create." North Carolina
Turnpike Auth. v. Pine Island, Inc., 265 N.C. 109, 114, 143 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1965).
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powers is permissible if "adequate guiding standards" are provided to govern the
exercise of the powers. 273 The court in Adams concluded that the authority
delegated to the CRC was accompanied by adequate guiding standards "in the
form of legislative declarations of goals and policies, and procedural
safeguards." 274
Authority granted to an administrative agency by beach access legislation
could easily meet the Adams guidelines. 275 Such legislation, however, would not
need to meet the Adams criteria if it did not delegate authority to administrative
agencies. This approach follows the pattern of most existing beach access legis-
lation. Enforcement is provided by state attorneys general, with resort to state
courts when necessary.2 76
3. Is Beach Access Legislation an Unconstitutional Taking of Private
Property for Public Use?
A third challenge to beach access legislation may be that it constitutes a
"taking" of private property in violation of the fifth amendment.2 77 The taking
doctrine not only prohibits actual confiscation of property by the government, it
also defines the "outer limits of permissible uncompensated regulation" 278 by
balancing the extent of harm to the landowner and the benefit afforded the pub-
lic.2 79 Beach access legislation that proposes to vest title to private beaches in
273. Adams, 295 N.C. at 698, 249 S.E.2d at 411; accord State ex rel. Dorothea Dix Hosp. v.
Davis, 292 N.C. 147, 158, 232 S.E.2d 698, 706 (1977); Guthrie v. Taylor, 279 N.C. 703, 712, 185
S.E.2d 193, 200 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972).
274. Adams, 295 N.C. at 701, 249 S.E.2d at 412-13. The court listed four sources of procedural
safeguards: (1) the Act itself; (2) the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act; (3) the Admin-
istrative Rules Review Committee created by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-30.26 (1978); and (4) the
"Sunset" legislation at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-34.10 to -35.1 (repealed by 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws
932). Under the "Sunset" legislation, unless CAMA was "revived by legislative action" it would be
repealed effective July 1, 1981. Adams, 295 N.C. at 702, 249 S.E.2d at 413. For an analysis of the
general assembly's delegation of authority under CAMA, see Glenn, supra note 262, at 314-27.
275. See supra text accompanying note 273. The Adams court stated that "[i]n passing upon the
constitutionality of a legislative act it is not for this Court to judge its wisdom and expediency.
These matters are the province of the General Assembly." Adams, 259 N.C. at 690, 249 S.E.2d at
406.
276. See, e-g., Tax. NAT. RES. CODE ANN., §§ 61.018 -.019 (Vernon 1978).
277. See supra note 206; see, eg., United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp.
769, 772 (D.V.I. 1974) (Virgin Islands Open Beach Act effected no taking of defendant landowner's
property rights without just compensation); Seaway v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923, 929 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964) (court declined to rule on constitutionality of Texas Open Beaches Act). The un-
compensated taking challenge also can be asserted against court decisions affecting property rights.
See supra note 206.
278. Glenn, supra note 262, at 327.
279. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922) (When the extent of diminu-
tion of private property reaches a certain magnitude, there must be an exercise of eminent domain
and compensation to sustain the act.). See generally F. Bossm.MAN, 0. CALLIS & J. BANTA, THE
TAXNG ISSUE (1973) (general discussion of taking); Michelman, supra note 205 (questioning courts'
practice of compensating for some, but not all, injuries to private property that result from govern-
ment action); Sax, Takings Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) (challenging
traditional view of property rights and arguing that broader questions of resource regulation and
costs of conflict should determine takings); Sax, supra note 214, at 36 (analyzing traditional ap-
proaches to problem of taking). For a discussion of the taking law in North Carolina, see Note,
North Carolina's Ridge Law: No View From The Top, 63 N.C.L. RPv. 197, 208-14 (1984).
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the public is an obvious taking.280 The difficulties arise in determining whether
regulations granting public access easements so restrict a landowner's property
use as to be a constructive taking of the property for public use.28 '
An initial question is whether the regulation is a proper exercise of the po-
lice power.282 This essentially is a due process inquiry into the legitimacy of the
ends sought and the reasonableness of the means adopted by the regulation. 283
The scope of the police power is broad enough to encompass most stated pur-
poses of legislation.28 4 The validity of the means, however, is less certain.
Whether the means are reasonable depends on their promotion of the public
good and the amount of interference with the property owner's right to use the
property as the owner deems appropriate.28 5
The second step of the due process analysis requires the court to determine
whether the regulation as applied constitutes a taking of private property.28 6 In
making this determination the courts will apply either the literal taking test28 7
or the regulatory taking test288 to determine whether there has been a judicial
taking of private property. 28 9 If a court holds that legislation actually has ap-
propriated private property, that will be an unconstitutional taking.290 If there
has been no actual appropriation, the court will apply the regulatory balancing
280. See R. CUNNnGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 28, at 513. Such legisla-
tion, however, might be a proper exercise of the state's eminent domain power if compensation is
made and the acquisition is for public use. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & I. YOUNG, supra note 207, at
495.
281. Taking by regulation was not recognized until 1922 when the Supreme Court invalidated a
Pennsylvania law prohibiting coal mining. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922).
282. See Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 261-62, 302 S.E.2d 204, 208
(1983). The police power gives states the authority to regulate land use in order to protect the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922); see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (application of law
that required preservation of historic property did not constitute a taking); Goldblatt v. Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962) (limits on excavating below the water table not shown to be such an onerous and
unreasonable burden on sand and gravel operation as to result in a taking of property); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition of brick manufacturing within city limits held not to be a
taking of property without due process); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (legislature has
power to determine what "measures are appropriate or needful" to promote general welfare). Gov-
ernment could not function if every change in the general law that diminished property values had to
be compensated. See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 393. Regulation that "goes too far," however,
"will be recognized as a taking." Id. at 415. The Court in Pennsylvania Coal noted that when fifth
amendment protection is "qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to
extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears." Id. at 417.
283. Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 261-62, 302 S.E.2d 204, 208
(1983).
284. Even wholly aesthetic purposes have been upheld. See State v. Jones, 305 N.C. 520, 290
S.E.2d 675 (1982) (North Carolina Supreme Court upheld ordinance requiring junkyards to put
fences around property). For an analysis of aesthetic regulation, see Note, State v. Jones: Aesthetic
Regulation-From Junkyards to Residences?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 942 (1983).
285. Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 261-62, 302 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1983);
A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 214, 258 S.E.2d 444, 449 (1979).
286. Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 263, 302 S.E.2d 204, 209 (1983).
287. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 217 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 218.
289. See supra notes 215-18.
290. See supra notes 215-16, 228-29 and accompanying text.
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test to determine whether a taking has occurred.2 91
The outcome of the balancing test will depend on the facts and circum-
stances of each case. The limits of permissible uncompensated beach access reg-
ulation have not yet been tested because present legislation does not create
rights; it merely recognizes and preserves existing public rights of access. 2 9 2
Legislation creating public easements, however, effectively would grant property
rights to the public. Under the regulatory balancing test, this does not itself
constitute a taking but it does place a heavy burden on the government to show
that the public benefits outweigh the private harm.293 Furthermore, it is possi-
ble that such legislation would be held to be an exercise of the state's eminent
domain power, so that compensation would be due the landowner.
Beach access legislation, if it is to be efficient and uniform, cannot possibly
take into account the "facts and circumstances" of each case. Broad legislation
proposing to vest public easement rights in the dry-sand area is, by its nature,
vulnerable to a taking challenge. This is true because in some beach areas the
private interest outweighs the public interest, while in others the opposite con-
clusion is compelled. Judicial decisions, however, must take into account the
facts and circumstances of each case. They are less vulnerable, therefore, to the
challenge that either public or private interests in a particular piece of property
were not considered. Furthermore, the only fairness to be achieved by beach
access legislation is uniformity of application. In the taking context, however,
fairness is achieved only when the effects on the individual landowner are con-
sidered and balanced with the public interest. This balancing can be accom-
plished only in a judicial proceeding.294
B. Approaches to Beach Access Legislation
Existing legislation295 takes three basic approaches to beach access. The
291. See supra note 230 and accompanying test.
292. The political constraints imposed by the perception of what is appropriate regulation may
partly account for this. See F. BOSSELMAN, 0. CALLmS & J. BANTA, supra note 279, at 318 ("IT]he
fear of the takings issue is stronger than the takings clause itself.").
293. See Sax, supra note 214, at 170; see also supra notes 238-51 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of balancing public benefits and private harm).
294. See supra note 187 and accompanying text for an example of a court balancing public and
private interests in a beach access decision.
295. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53035-53036, 54091-54093 (West 1983); CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE
§§ 30210-30224 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); HAWAn REv. STAT. § 115 (1976 & Supp. 1984); OR.
REV. STAT. § 390.605 -.630 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-134.1 to 134.3 (1983); TEx. NAT.
Rns. CODE ANN, §§ 61.001-.131 (Vernon 1978); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 402-403 (1982).
Three federal Open Beach Bills have been proposed but never passed. The Eckhardt Open
Beaches Bill, H.R. 10394, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), would have impressed the nation's beaches
with a public right of free access and use and would have prohibited obstruction of the beach area.
The National Open Beaches Act of 1971, S. 631, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971), would have established
a presumption that the public has a right of access to and over the beaches and would have appropri-
ated funds to acquire public access easements. The Open Beaches Act of 1969, H.R. 6656, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), would have established a similar presumption and appropriated funds for
public easements.
Denmark has enacted public access legislation establishing a right of public travel in the dry-
sand area. The right includes temporary recreational use of private property, exclusive of 50 meters
around inhabited buildings. Furthermore, if upland access is insufficient, the Minister of the Envi-
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first approach creates a presumption that title of the littoral owner does not
include the right to prevent the public from using the dry-sand area.29 6 The
second makes the issuance of development permits contingent upon the devel-
oper's dedication of public accessways. 297 The third authorizes acquisition, im-
provement, and maintenance of public accessways. 298
The Texas Open Beaches Bill299 exemplifies the first approach. The statute
creates a presumption3 °O that public rights of access exist in the dry-sand
area.301 Beyond this, the statute merely provides a means by which "members
of the public may enforce such collective rights as they may have legally ac-
quired by reason of dedication, prescription, or which they may have retained by
continuous right. ' 30 2 Although the bill is prefaced with a strong public policy
statement in favor of public access, 30 3 it protects public access only if the public
already has acquired the rights set forth in the bill. Thus, the bill lacks any
significant legal utility; public rights still must be established by judicial
proceeding.
There are, however, two valuable aspects of the Texas legislation. First, the
presumption of a public right of access shifts the burden of proof to the land-
owner to establish the right to exclude.3° 4 Second, in directing the attorney
general to seek injunctive relief for removal of obstructions, the bill saves indi-
vidual plaintiffs the expense of litigation.30 5
The second approach, compulsory dedication, requires developers to dedi-
cate public easements for beach access in return for development permits.30 6
This approach has several advantages. First, because developers bear the cost, it
is inexpensive to the public. 30 7 Second, it does not require prior public use of a
ronment can require the municipality to establish a public accessway, although compensation may
be due the landowner. See Rehling, Planning and the Coastal Zone-An Overview of the Danish
Approach, 4 URB. LAw & POL'Y 189, 193 (1981).
296. TE. NAT. Rns. CODE ANN. §§ 61.020(l)-(2) (Vernon 1978); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 402-403 (1982).
297. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30212 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
298. Id. §§ 31400-31406; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-134.1 (1983).
299. TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 61.001-.131 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1985).
300. The presumption gives the plaintiff a prima facie case in favor of the public's right of use.
Note, The Texas Open Beaches Act" Public Rights to Beach Access, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 383, 387
(1976). Although constitutional problems "are raised by the creation and use of presumptions in
criminal cases," the problems are not as serious in civil cases. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 345, at
985 (3d ed. 1984). It is "extremely unlikely that there are now serious constitutional limits on the
effect that may be given to presumptions in civil cases." Id. at 987.
301. TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 61.020 (Vernon 1978). A prima facie case of a public access
right is made out upon a mere showing that the disputed area is the dry-sand beach. The court in
Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923, 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) refused to address the
constitutionality of this presumption.
302. Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923, 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
303. "It is declared and armed... that... the public shall have the free and unrestricted
right of ingress and egress to the larger area extending from the line of mean low tide to the line of
vegetation bordering on the Gulf of Mexico." TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 61.011 (Vernon 1978).
304. See id. § 61.020(l).
305. See id. § 61.018.
306. See CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30212 (West Supp. 1985). See generally R. DUCKER, supra
note 8, at 55-68, 141-54 (discussion of compulsory dedication).
307. See Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564, 572 (1970). The expense to the
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beach area. 308 Third, it can prevent litigation by eliminating conflict in rapidly
developing areas.3°9 Last, there are probably no constitutional problems with
compulsory dedication. 310 California's compulsory dedication statute l1 was
challenged as an unconstitutional taking and was found to be constitutional. 312
The California Supreme Court held that "[a] regulatory body may constitution-
ally require a dedication of property in the interests of the general welfare as a
condition of permitting land development." 313
North Carolina law permits compulsory dedication of land for recreational
purposes in subdivisions.314 Dedicated areas, however, are required to serve
only residents of "the immediate neighborhood within the subdivision.1315 It is
not clear whether these areas could be used by nonresidents of the
subdivision.316
The third approach to beach access legislation-acquisition of easements
through public funds-is the approach taken by North Carolina and is consid-
ered below.
C. Beach Access Legislation: The North Carolina Approach
The North Carolina Coastal and Estuarine Water Beach Access Pro-
gram3 17 was enacted in 1981318 in response to a controversy over setback regu-
public actually is no less than that of easements created by common-law dedication because implied
dedication easements are "free" to the public. Under the California statute new developments must
provide public accessways from the "nearest public roadway to the shoreline and along the coast."
CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 30212(a) (West Supp. 1985). The accessway is not required to be open to
the public, however, until a public agency or private association agrees to accept liability and respon-
s bility for maintenance of the accessway. Id. Acceptance of the dedication, then, is required of the
municipality, unless a private acceptance is offered.
308. See Note, supra note 307, at 571.
309. See Id.
310. See generally R. CUNNINrHAM, W. STOEBUcK & D. WHmmAN, supra note 28, § 9.17, at594-99 (discussion of constitutionality of compulsory dedication). One commentator has argued
that "no settled constitutional doctrine has been created" for compulsory dedication. Note, supra
note 307, at 570.
311. CAL PuB. REs. CODE § 30212 (West Supp. 1985).
312. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 678, 698-99, 183
Cal. Rptr. 395, 407-08 (1982). The court found the required easements to be "'reasonably related'
to one of the principal objectives of [California's] Coastal Act which is to provide for maximum[public] access to the coast." Id. at 700, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08. This is the same standard used by
North Carolina courts to determine whether legislation is unconstitutional local legislation. See
supra notes 261-66 and accompanying text.
313. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 678, 699, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 395, 407 (1982).
314. N.C. Gm. STAT. § 160A-372 (1982).
315. Id.
316. Exclusion of nonresidents could raise equal protection questions. See Borough of Neptune
City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 NJ. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972) (municipality may not restrict
nonresidents' use of public beach by means of fee differentials); see also Brindley v. Borough of
Lavallette, 33 NJ. Super. 344, 349, 110 A.2d 157, 159 (Law Div. 1954) (ordinance prohibiting
nonresidents from using public beach held invalid). The beaches in these cases had been dedicated
to the public by the municipality, not private owners. See also Note, Non-Resident Restrictions in
Municipally Owned Beacher Approaches to the Problem, 10 COLum. J.L. & Soc. PROns. 177, 184-91(1974) (discussing equal protection clause as applied to restrictions of municipal beaches).
317. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-134.1 to -134.3 (1983).
318. Act of July 10, 1981, ch. 925, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1422. To date, 1.2 million dollars has
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lations3 1 9 imposed on oceanfront development.3 20 The legislation directs the
state to "establish a comprehensive program for the identification, the acquisi-
tion, improvement and maintenance of public accessways to the ocean and estu-
arine beaches."' 321 The access program is coordinated with the state's coastal
management program; 322 funding is provided through annual appropriations by
the North Carolina General Assembly.323 The Coastal Resources Commission
adopts program standards and gives priority "to acquisition of lands which, due
to adverse effects. . . of natural hazards, such as past and potential erosion,
flooding and storm damage, are unsuitable for the placement of permanent
structures.
' 32 4
The Beach Access Program statute notes long-standing public use of the
State's ocean beaches among the legislative findings that preface the statute's
substantive provisions:
The public has traditionally fully enjoyed the State's ocean and estua-
rine beaches and public access to and use of the beaches. The beaches
provide a recreational resource of great importance to North Carolina
and its citizens and this makes a significant contribution to the eco-
nomic well-being of the State. The ocean and estuarine beaches are
resources of statewide significance and have been customarily freely
used and enjoyed by people throughout the State. 325
The findings recognize, however, that public access is "becoming severely lim-
been appropriated. Most of the funds have been used for regional projects and for improvements to
state-owned lands or lands obtained by local governments through grants or donations. An appro-
priation of $500,000 has been recommended for 1985 and 1986. Telphone interview with David
Owens, Assistant Director, Division of Coastal Management, Coastal Resources Commission (Jan.
4, 1985).
319. Setback regulations regulate the "distance from a curb, property line, or structure, within
which building is prohibited." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (5th ed. 1979). See generally D.
HAGMAN, supra note 73, § 60 (1975) (explaining use of setback regulations in land use law).
320. See Owens, Land Acquisition and Coastal Resource Management A Pragmatic Perspective,
24 WM. & MARY L. REy. 625, 652 (1983). To prevent property loss the CRC adopted regulations in
1979 requiring minimum setbacks. "[W]hen combined with local highway setback and septic tank
restrictions," the CRC's regulations "rendered many small oceanfront lots impossible" to develop.
Id. The general assembly initially addressed the issue of compensation for property owners who had
been denied building permits because of setback restrictions. A Coastal Land Acquisition Fund
would have purchased the restricted lands for public use as accessways. S.B. 232, 1981 N.C. General
Assembly. This bill was superseded by the enacted bill establishing a permanent acquisition pro-
gram. 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 925.
321. N.C. GE.N. STAT. § 113A-134.1 (1983). The authority given is for direct purchase of ac-
cessways; the program does not authorize an exercise of eminent domain power.
322. Id. § 113A-134.2.
323. Interview with David Owens, supra note 318. State funds may be supplemented by local
matching funds. Id.
324. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-134.3 (1983).
Funds are used for regional projects, neighborhood projects, local projects, or signs. Regional
projects include restrooms, 25 or more parking spaces, a dune crossover, and trash containers. Divi-
SION OF COASTAL MANAGEMENT, COASTAL RESOURCES COMMmION, BEACH AccEss PROJECT
FUNDING: 1982 PROJECTS 2 (1982) (available from Division of Coastal Management Coastal Re-
sources Commission, Raleigh, North Carolina). Neighborhood projects include five to ten parking
spaces, a dune crossover, and trash containers, and may include handicapped facilities. Id. Local
projects include trash containers and may or may not include a dune crossover. Id. Signs indicating
beach accessways have a beach access logo and the name of the city or county where the accessway
is located. Id.
325. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-134.1 (1983).
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ited in some areas" and that "[p]ublic purposes would be served by providing
increased access."'326 Finally, the statute declares that placement of "permanent
substantial structures on [hazardous oceanfront lots] will lead to increased risks
of loss of life and property, increased public costs, and potential eventual en-
croachment of structures onto the beach." 327
North Carolina's approach to beach access legislation "establishes an af-
firmative role for state government in identifying, acquiring, improving, and
maintaining public access to the beaches," 3 28 a role previously reserved for local
governments.329 Furthermore, the program has several advantages over other
approaches. First, because all accessways are purchased from the landowner
rather than acquired through the police power, the state avoids a taking chal-
lenge. Second, the program assures perpendicular access33 0 in areas where pre-
vious public use may be insufficient to satisfy common-law doctrines of
prescription, implied dedication, and custom. 331 Third, it obviates any need for
litigation to establish public rights of use because all easements are acquired by
direct purchase.332 Last, it places the burden of paying for access on the public,
rather than on individual landowners.
V. CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Beach Access Program is the most effective and appro-
priate legislative tool to provide upland access to the beaches. Use of the dry-
sand area for recreation and access to the foreshore, however, cannot be pro-
vided by the program because of the prohibitively high cost of beach land. Leg-
islation establishing public rights in the dry-sand area is not recommended
because it invites litigation and presents serious constitutional problems. At-
tempts to establish public rights in dry-sand areas by prescription, implied dedi-
cation, and custom are unlikely to be successful in the North Carolina courts.
Furthermore, extension of these doctrines to provide beach access would con-
fuse their traditional application in settled areas of the law.
This Comment recommends that the North Carolina courts expand the
public trust doctrine to include recreational use of the dry-sand beach. This
326. Id. Regulations adopted under the statute define the beach as "an area extending from the
mean low to the mean high water line and beyond this line to where either the growth of vegetation
occurs or a distinct change in slope or elevation occurs, or [land]owners have specifically and legally
restricted access above the mean high water line." N.C. Coastal Resources Comm'n Reg., 15 N.C.
AnMn. CODE 7M.0302(c) (1985). The regulations state further that "[tihis definition is intended to
describe those shorefront areas customarily freely used by the public." Id. The definition, however,
is a policy statement only and does "not in any way require private property owners to provide
public access to the beach." Id.
327. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-134.1 (1983). This concern resulted in regulations prohibiting
permanent seawalls and bulkheads from ocean beaches. N.C. Coastal Resources Comm'n Reg., 15
N.C. ADMIN. CODE 7H.0308(2) (1985).
328. Owens, supra note 320, at 653.
329. Id. at 653 n.135.
330. "Perpendicular access" means access to the beach over upland property.
331. The Texas Open Beaches Bill presents this problem. See supra notes 299-305 and accompa-
nying text.
332. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-134.3 (1983).
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recommendation is made not only because of the limitations on the other com-
mon-law doctrines, but also because the public trust doctrine historically has
been tied to the oceanshores and gives the state an affirmative "duty. . . to
protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tide-
lands."'333 Traditionally, the public trust "functioned as a restraint on the states'
abilities to alienate public trust lands." 334 More recently, it has evolved "into a
source of positive state duties," 335 and a "common law principle flexible enough
to meet diverse modem needs." 336 Judicial expansion of the doctrine, however,
should be limited to those areas in which it is necessary to satisfy the public
interests protected by the trust.337 The courts must not recognize public trust
rights in private beach land without balancing public and private interests. In
areas of diminishing public beaches or increased public demand, the public inter-
est in access to and use of private dry-sand beaches will naturally be greater than
in areas where public access is not a problem or not in demand. The public trust
doctrine is meaningless without access to the foreshore and recreational use of
the dry-sand beach. As more people seek solace and recreation at the "ex-
tremest limit of land,"338 the North Carolina courts should adapt the public
trust doctrine to meet the changing public needs.3
39
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333. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 441, 658 P.2d 709, 724, 189
Cal. Rptr. 346, 360-61, cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 (1983).
334. District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
335. Id. at 1083.
336. Id.
337. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
338. H. MELVILLE, supra note 1, at 3.
339. See I WATER & WATER RIGHTS, supra note 138, § 36.4(B), at 202 ("The law regarding the
public use of property held in part for the benefit of the public must changa. as the public need
changes."). The court in Woodman v. Pitman, 79 Me. 456, 10 A. 321 (1887), eloquently stated this
same idea:
The inexhaustible and ever-changing complications in human affairs are constantly
presenting new questions and new conditions which the law must provide for as they arise;
and the law has expansive and adaptive force enough to respond to the demands thus made
of it; not by subverting, but by forming new combinations and making new applications out
of, its already established principles,-the result produced being only the "new corn that
cometh out of the old fields."
Id. at 458, 10 A. at 322.
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